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Defamation and the Right of Privacy
JOHN W. WADE*
In this article Dean Wade discusses the scope of the tort of un-
warranted invasion of the right of privacy, comparing and contrasting
it with the tort of defamation. He observes that the action for invasion
of the right of privacy may come to supplant the action for defamation
and that this development should be welcomed by the courts and writers.
Finally, he concludes that the whole law of privacy may someday be-
come a part of the larger, more comprehensive tort of intentional in-
fliction of mental suffering.
I. INTRODUOTMON
The history of the two torts of defamation and unwarranted invasion
of the right of privacy has been greatly different. Defamation developed
over a period of many centuries, with the twin torts of libel and slander
having completely separate origins and historical growth. Professor Street
summarizes this history by declaring that there was "a perversion of
evolutionary processes," with the result that there was produced "a rather
heterogeneous pile which should normally have gone to form a consistent
body of legal doctrine, but which on the contrary, comprises many dis-
connected fragments moving in a confused way under the impulse of
different principles." He concludes that the verdict which must be reached
regarding "this branch of the law" is that it was "marred in the making."1
Efforts at judicial and legislative reform have not proved very successful.2
The right of privacy, on the other hand, is of quite recent development.
Its origin is the remarkable law review article of Messrs. Warren and
Brandeis, published in 1890,3 and the first decision of a court of last resort
recognizing the right was in the current century.4 At the start the judicial
Dean, Vanderbilt University School of Law.
1. 1 STnEET, FOUNDATIONS OF LEGAL LrLnmrry 273 (1960). For treatment of the
history of defamation see Donnelly, History of Defamation, 1949 Wis. L. 1k~v. 99;
Green, Slander and Libel 6 AM. L. REv. 593 (1872); Lovell, The "Reception" of De-
famation by the Common Law, p. 1051 supra; Veeder, History and Theory of the Law
of Defamation I, 3 CoLum. L. REV. 546 (1903); Veeder, History and Theory of the
Law of Defamation 11, 4 CoLum. L. REv. 33 (1904).
2. The most ambitious attempt at legislative reform is the English Defamation Act,
1952, 15 & 16 GEo. 6 & 1 ELiz. 2, c. 66. See REPORT OF THE CoMMirrEE ON THE
LAW OF DEFAMATION, Cmd. 7536 (1948).
3. Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REv. 193 (1890). Slightly
earlier, Judge Cooley had spoken of the "right to be let alone." COOLEY, TORTS 29
(2d ed. 1888).
4. Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190, 50 S.E. 68 (1905).
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reception to the idea was mixed, and even the courts which espoused the
theory felt compelled to write a long "apologia" for adopting it.5 But
the doctrine has been well established in the United States6 for a number
of years now, and the attributes and characteristics of the tort are taking
clear shape.7
The difference between the two torts is now well known. As the
Massachusetts court put it, "The fundamental difference between a right
to privacy and a right to freedom from defamation is that the former
directly concerns one's own peace of mind, while the latter concerns
primarily one's reputation."8 But there have been overlappings from the
beginning. In the first place, though defamation seeks to protect reputa-
tion and though mental distress cannot supply the requirement of special
damages where it is required in order to impose liability,9 it has consistently
been held that when an action lies for defamation, the plaintiff can recover
for emotional distress and resulting bodily harm. 10 In the second place,
the law of defamation has been expanded to include certain situations
where there was no real injury to the plaintiff's reputation but he was held
up to ridicule or otherwise subjected to mental disturbance. 1
5. "In recent years the courts which have recognized the right to privacy for the
first time have not felt obliged to indulge in lengthy apologia. This is the final stage
in the acceptance of any new doctrine." Nizer, The Right of Privacy: A Half
Century's Developments, 39 Micir. L. REw. 526, 536 (1941). Note that this was written
almost a dozen years ago, and there have been substantial developments since that time.
6. Great Britain has never given legal recognition to the right of privacy. For con-
flicting views, see Goodhart, The Law of Defamation and Freedom of Speech, 13
CuniaEs LEGAL Pnormvis 135, 145-46 (1960); Winfield, Privacy, 47 L.Q. REV. 23
(1931). See also Neill, The Protection of Privacy, 25 MoDERN L. RE,. 393 (1962).
As to the continent, see Gutteridge & Walton, The Comparative Law of the Right of
Privacy, 47 L.Q. Rav. 203 (1931).
7. There is no need to cite all of the articles which have discussed the tort. The best
single treatment is Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. Rav. 383 (1960); see also Paossnn,
TORTs ch. 20 (2d ed. 1955). Among other leading treatments are Dickler, The Right
of Privacy, A Proposed Redefinition, 70 U.S.L. Raw. 435 (1936); Feinberg, Recent
Developments in the Law of Privacy, 48 CoLm. L. Rnv. 713 (1948); Green, The
Right of Privacy, 27 ILL. L. Raw. 237 (1932); Nizer, The Right of Privacy: A Half
Century's Developments, 39 MxcH. L. BEv. 526 (1948); Yankwich, The Right of
Privacy, 27 NormE DAmE LAw. 499 (1952). The most recent treatment is Reed,
Privacy: A Brief Commentary, 1962 INs. L.J. 618. See ERNST & ScMVAn-z, PRvAcVY:
Tn BIGrr To BE LET ALoNE (1962) for a new book popularizing the subject and
written for a lay audience.
8. Themo v. New England Newspaper Publishing Co., 306 Mass. 54, 27 N.E.2d 753,
755 (1940).
9. The leading case is Terwilliger v. Wands, 17 N.Y. 54 (1858); see also Scott v.
Harrison, 215 N.C. 427, 2 S.E.2d 1 (1939); Allsop v. Ailsop, 5 H. & N. 534, 157
Eng. Rep. 1292 (Ex. 1860).
10. See, Adams v. Smith, 58 Ill. 417 (1871); GATLLE, L Er. AND SLNaDR § 1148
(5th ed. 1960); NEwELL, SLADErn AND LInEL § 725 (4th ed. 1924).
11. Several of these cases are collected in a quotation from Themo v. New England
Newspaper Publishing Co., 306 Mass. 54, 27 N.E.2d 753, 754 (1940): "Modem cases
have made it possible to reach certain indecent violations of privacy by means of the law
of libel, on the theory that any writing is a libel that discredits the plaintiff in the minds
[VeOL. 151094
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From the other side, there has been a group of cases in which recovery
has been permitted for invasion of the right of privacy where the de-
fendant's statements gave a false impression concerning the plaintiff, and
where his reputation may well have been injured by the communication.12
The number of these cases has increased so greatly in recent years that
they have come to be classified as one of the separate torts in the "complex
of four" which constitute the law of privacy,13 and the suggestion has
been made that the law of privacy may be "capable of swallowing up and
engulfing the whole law of public defamation." 14
of any considerable and respectable class in the community though no wrongdoing or
bad character is imputed to him. Ingalls v. Hastings & Sons Publishing Co., [304]
Mass. [31], 22 N.E.2d 657 [1939]. Accordingly, it may be found libelous to publish
a photograph which represents the plaintiff as being ridiculously though unbelievably
malformed (Burton v. Crowell Publishing Co., 2 Cir., 82 F.2d 154 [19363); to exhibit
a wax figure representing the plaintiff, who had been acquitted of murder by shooting,
with a gun near him (Monson v. Tussauds, Ltd. [1894] 1 Q.B. 671; to publish of a
woman that she had been ravished (Youssouppoff v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Pictures,
Ltd. 50 T.L.R. 581 [C.A. 1934]); to publish of a man that his sister had been arrested
for larceny (Merrill v. Post Publishing Co., 197 Mass. 185, 190, 83 N.E. 419 [1908]);
to impute to a woman the publishing of the details of her love affair (Karjavainean v.
MacFadden Publications, Inc., [305] Mass. [573], 26 N.E.2d 538 [1940]); to impute
to a dramatic actress an appearance in burlesque in scanty costume (Louka v. Park
Entertainments, Inc., 294 Mass. 268, 1 N.E.2d 41 [1936]); to impute to a woman the
giving of a testimonial for a brand of whiskey (Peck v. Tribune Co., 214 U.S. 185;
29 S. Ct. 554; 53 L. Ed. 960, 16 Ann. Cas. 1075 [1909]); to impute to a prominent
man the giving of a testimonial for a patent medicine. (Foster-Milburn Co. v. Chinn,
134 Ky. 424, 120 S.W. 364, 34 L.R.A., N.S., 1137, 135 Am. St. Rep. 417 [1909]); or
to impute to an amateur athlete consent to the use of his name and likeness in adver-
tising chocolate. Tolley v. J.S. Fry & Sons, Ltd. [1931] A.C. 333." Other cases which
might be added are Zbyszko v. New York American, 228 App. Div. 277, 239 N.Y.
Supp. 411 (1930) (putting wrestler's picture next to that of a gorilla in article on evolu-
tion); Dall v. Time, Inc., 252 App. Div. 636, 300 N.Y. Supp. 680 (1937) (fictional
statement perfectly apparent if whole item was read). See GREaN,, MALONE, PEDriCK &
RAEL, CASES ON INJUnIEs TO RELATIONS 373-76 (1959).
Reference may be made also to two unpublished English cases described in DEAN,
HATrED, RmiuLE OR CONTEMNT ch. 14 (1953): Plumb v. Jeyes Sanitary Compound
Co. (1937) (policeman's picture used to advertise deodorizing "fluid foot-bath");
Honeysett v. News Chronicle, Ltd. (1935) ("doctored" composite picture of plaintiff on
bicycle used in article on "Unchaperoned Holidays").
In most, if not all, of these cases, action for invasion of the right of privacy would
have more accurately met the injury to the plaintiff and produced less distortion to
existing rules of law.
12. These cases are collected and discussed in the next section of this article.
13. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REv. 383, 389 (1960). Dean Prosser describes
these four torts as follows: "1. Intrusion upon the plaintiff's seclusion or solitude, or
into his private affairs. 2. Public disclosure of embarrassing facts about the plaintiff.
3. Publicity which places the plaintiff in a false light in the public eye. 4. Appropriation,
for the defendant's advantage, of the plaintiff's name or likeness." Several courts have
already quoted this classification. See, e.g., Norris v. Moskin Stores, Inc., 277 Ala. 174,
132 So. 2d 321 (1961); Werner v. Times-Mirror Co., 193 Cal. App. 2d 111, 14 Cal.
Rptr. 208 (Dist. Ct. App. 1961); Harms v. Miami Daily News, Inc., 127 So. 2d 715
(Fla. 1961); Peterson v. Idaho First Nat'l Bank, 83 Idaho 578, 367 P.2d 284 (1961);
Yoder v. Smith, 112 N.W. 2d 862 (Iowa 1962).
14. Prosser, supra note 13, at 401.
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A careful study of the relationship between the two torts is thus clearly
warranted. 15 This article is an attempt to present such a study, with
particular emphasis upon the privacy cases in order to permit conclusions
about developments in the future.
II. PIIvIcY CASES INVOLVIM FALSE STATEMENTS
The first privacy case giving express legal recognition to the right of
privacy belongs in the classification of privacy cases involving the creation
of a false impression regarding the plaintiff as much as in the category
involving appropriation of the plaintiff's name for commercial purposes.
In Pavesich v. New England Life Insurance Co.,16 defendant published
a newspaper advertisement carrying two pictures with the legends, "Do it
now. The man who did," and "Do it while you can. The man who didn't."
The picture above the first legend was that of the plaintiff, an artist who
had no insurance policy with the defendant and had not given consent to
the use of his picture. The Georgia court held that this was both an
unwarranted invasion of the right of privacy and a libel. Its reasoning as
to libel: plaintiff had alleged that his friends knew that he had no insurance
with defendant; when they saw him claim in the ad that he bad they would
assume that he was lying, either gratuitously or for money, and in either
event he would be discredited and held in contempt.
The overlap is made somewhat more vivid by a Kentucky case four years
later. In Foster-Milburn Co. v. Chinn,17 defendant company, which pro-
duced Doan's Kidney Pills, published a "Directory" containing a picture of
plaintiff, a state senator, with an endorsement of the pills and a statement
that they had eliminated his trouble. Apparently a practical joker had
sent the letter and picture to the defendant, and it had published them
without checking. Plaintiff brought a libel action, but the court discussed
the right of privacy at length and cited and quoted the Pavesich case on
the subject. The court held that it was proper for plaintiff to show that
15. Aside from Dean Prosser's treatment, the relationship between the two torts has
been considered in the following: Powsner, Libel in Limbo: Another Conquest for the
Right of Privacy?, 30 L.A. BAR BuLL. 365 (1955); Spiegel, Public Celebrity v. Scandal
Magazine-The Celebrity's Right to Privacy, 30 So. CAL. L. REv. 280 (1957); Com-
ment, 50 CALIF. L. REv. 357 (1962). See also Wigmore, The Right Against False
Attribution of Belief or Utterance, 4 Ky. L.J. [No. 8] 3 (1916).
Even as the right of privacy was first beginning to develop some treatment was given
the relationship between the two torts. See Adams, The Right of Privacy, and Its
Relation to the Law of Libel, 39 AM. L. REv. 37 (1905). And see 1 STREET,
FOUNDATONS OF LEGAL LiABnxryT 319 (1906): "It is supposed that if such a right
[of privacy] is to be born it must come in some way from the law of libel. Those who
contend for a right of personal security broad enough to include a general right 'to be
let alone' would not perhaps admit this, but unquestionably the law of libel furnishes a
nearer approach to the indicated goal than any other branch of tort."
16. 122 Ga. 190, 50 S.E. 68 (1905).
17. 134 Ky. 424, 120 S.W. 364 (1909).
[ VOL. 15
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he had been ridiculed and laughed at by his friends and that there was a
scale of prices for endorsements of this nature, in order to demonstrate
the implication that he had sold his endorsement. The case is treated
as the one establishing the legal right of privacy in Kentucky, and is cited
by later Kentucky cases as the origin of the doctrine.
There have been a number of other right-of-privacy cases where re-
covery was permitted for a wrongful use of plaintiff's alleged endorsement
to advertise a product. In Flake v. Greensboro News Co.,18 for example, a
young lady whose picture was placed in an ad by mistake was identified as
"Mlle. Sally Payne, exotic red haired Venus" from the "Folies de Paree,"
endorsing certain bread; the court allowed an action for invasion of the
right of privacy though holding that a count for libel would not lie. Again,
in Fairfield v. American Photocopy Equipment Co.,19 plaintiff was identified
in an advertisement as one of many "leading law firms" who were satisfied
users of a copying machine, when he had found it unsatisfactory and re-
turned it; the court held that an action for invasion of the right of privacy
was appropriate, explaining that the "injury is mental and subjective"
and that plaintiff should be allowed to testify as to calls from other lawyers
and the mental anguish they caused. And again, in Munden v. Harris20 an
advertisement carried a picture of plaintiff, a 5-year-old boy, and had him
saying, 'Tapa is going to buy Mama an Elgin watch for a present and
some one (I mustn't tell who) is going to buy my big sister a diamond
ring. So don't you think you ought to buy me something? The payments
are so easy, you'll never miss the money if you get it from Harris-Goar Co."
The court held that counts might lie for invasion of the right of privacy
and for libel. It explained that the statement had plaintiff speaking publicly
about private affairs of his parents and his sister and would subject him
to the "vexation and humiliation of ridicule" through the teasing of his
playmates.2 '
Somewhat similar is a group of cases where defendant has utilized
plaintiff's name in a fashion where it might be treated as an appropriation
but where the major injury lies in the false implication regarding the
plaintiff which is derived from the use. Perhaps the earliest of these cases
is that of Lord Byron v. Johnston,22 in which Lord Byron was able to enjoin
18. 212 N.C. 780, 195 S.E. 55 (1938).
19. 138 Cal. App. 2d 82, 291 P.2d 194 (Dist. Ct. App. 1955).
20. 153 Mo. App. 652, 134 S.W. 1076 (1911).
21. See also Manger v. Kree Institute of Electrolysis, Inc., 233 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1956)
(contest essay changed to make it appear to be an endorsement). In Mackenzie v.
Soden Mineral Springs Co., 27 Abb. N. Cas. 402, 18 N.Y. Supp. 240 (Sup. Ct. 1891),
plaintiff, a prominent British physician, was granted an injunction against the use of
false letters from him endorsing and recommending "Soden Mineral Pastilles" for sore
throat, catarrh, etc. Relief was denied under similar conditions in Dockrell v. Dougall,
78 L.T. 840 (Q.B. 1898), when the jury found the purported statement was not
libelous.
22. 2 Mer. 29, 35 Eng. Rep. 851 (Ch. 1816).
1962 ] 1097
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defendant from publishing spurious poems under his name. Similar is
D'Altomonte v. New York Herald Co.,23 where a ridiculous story on "stop-
ping a Congo cannibal feast," written in the first person and highly self-
praising, was attributed to a reputable explorer.24 Plaintiff's name was
wrongfully signed to a telegram to the governor asking him to veto a bill
controlling optical practice in Hinish v. Meier & Frank Co.25 In holding
that this constituted an unwarranted invasion of the right of privacy the
court called attention to the fact that as a federal employee he was under
the restrictions of the Hatch Act. In Marks v. Jaffa26 defendant placed
the name of plaintiff, a well-known actor (also a law student) in a popu-
larity contest with another prominent actor; an injunction was granted.2 7
A false attribution of belief was involved in Goldberg v. Ideal Publishing
Corp.2 A "romance" magazine published an article in which a minister, a
priest, and a rabbi were asked certain sex questions and had their answers
published. Plaintiff, the rabbi, brought action alleging that he had had
no such interview and that the sex views imputed to him were not his. A
motion to dismiss the count based on the New York right-of-privacy statute
was denied.2
In certain other cases, the.use of the name is less significant than false
statements which were made in connection with the use of the name and
which created a false impression which was embarrassing and offensive.
Thus, in Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Vandergrff,30 defendant tire
company had an employee call four other tire companies, falsely pretend-
ing to be the plaintiff, asking for confidential prices on tires. Another
employee compared the prices with defendant's, and told one of the tire
companies that he did not see how it could sell at that price. When it asked
how he obtained the price, he said that defendant had given it to them.
A demurrer to the complaint was held properly overruled. 31 In Hamilton
23. 154 App. Div. 453, 139 N.Y. Supp. 200 (1913).
24. The decision that action would lie both for libel and for violation of the New
York Civil Rights Statute was reversed as to the statute by a memorandum decision in
208 N.Y. 596, 102 N.E. 1101 (1913). Cf. Martin v. The Picayune, 115 La. 979, 40
So. 376 (1906), where it was held to be libelous to publish a purportedly self-narrated
account of a marvelous cure by plaintiff physician.
25. 166 Ore. 482, 113 P.2d 438 (1941).
26. 6 Misc. 290, 26 N.Y. Supp. 908 (N.Y. City Ct. 1893).
27. Like the case of Mackenzie v. Soden Mineral Springs Co., supra note 21, this case
was decided prior to the New York Right of Privacy Act, and also prior to Roberson
v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 171 N.Y. 538, 64 N.E. 442 (1902), which denied the
existence of a common law right of privacy in New York.
28. 210 N.Y.S.2d 928 (Sup. Ct. 1960). Cf. State ex rel. La Follette v. Hinkle,
131 Wash. 86, 229 Pac. 317 (1924) (candidate for national office entitled to relief
against state "party" using his name, when it was not in accord with his views).
29. The decision in this case was anticipated by 44 years in an article by Dean
Wigmore, The Right Against False Attribution of Belief or Utterance, 4 Ky. L.. [No.
81 3 (1916).
30. 52 Ga. App. 662, 184 S.E. 452 (1936).
31. "[Pllacing the plaintiff in the position of having procured confidential prices on
[ VOL. 15
RIGHT OF PRIVACY
v. Lumbermen's Mutual Casualty Co.32 plaintiff, an engaged man living in
Baton Rouge, was seriously hurt in an accident and unable to give an
account of it. Defendant, his insurance company, without his knowledge,
put an ad in the paper with his name and a New Orleans address and
telephone number, asking witnesses to the accident to get in touch with
him. When persons called the listed number, a woman employee of
defendant answered and claimed to be the plaintiff's wife. A jury verdict
for $12,500 was reduced to $3,000.
Even more difficult to explain on the appropriation theory is Kerby v.
Hal Roach Studios, Inc.33 As a publicity stunt, advertising one of the
"Topper" movies, defendant sent to 1000 men a tinted perfumed letter
reading:
Dearest: Don't breathe it to a soul, but I'm back in Los Angeles and more
curious than ever to see you. Remember how I cut up about a year ago?
Well, I'm raring to go again, and believe me rim in the mood for fun.
Let's renew our acquaintanceship and I promise you an evening you won't
forget. Meet me in front of Warner's Downtown Theatre at 7th and Hill on
Thursday. Just look for a girl with a gleam in her eye, a smile on her lips,
and mischief on her mind! Fondly, your ectoplasmic playmate, Marion Kerby.
Plaintiff had the same name, as could have been discovered from the
telephone directory. She was held to have an action for the mental suffer-
ing resulting from invasion of her right of privacy.
A similar use of the mail to create a false imilication of sexual mis-
conduct was involved in Freeman v. Busch Jewelry Co.,34 where the store,
seeking to collect a debt, sent plaintiff a postcard reading: "Dear Milford,
I'll be in La Grange next week. Call me at 9693. Love, Mary." Plaintiff's
wife saw it and marital difficulties resulted. The court held that a tort was
committed and it was not necessary to label it "as one arising from violation
of the right of privacy, as plaintiff contends ... or, as seems more likely, to
this court, as arising from publication of a libel."35
There is a group of about a dozen cases in which the plaintiff was
allowed to recover for an invasion of his right of privacy when the de-
fendant carried his picture with a published item-usually an article-
which gave a false impression of the plaintiff's character. An example is
tires, and then betraying the confidence imposed in him by giving the quoted prices
to competitors, had a 'tendency to bring the plaintiff into contempt or ridicule' and
'entitles him to recover, without proof of special damage."' 184 S.E. at 454.
32. 82 So. 2d 61 (La. App. 1955).
33. 53 Cal. App. 2d 207, 127 P.2d 577 (Dist. Ct. App. 1942).
34. 98 F. Supp. 963 (N.D. Ga. 1951).
35. Id. at 966. Cf. Norris v. Moskin Stores, Inc., 272 Ala. 174, 132 So. 2d 321
(1961) (phone calls to similar effect-recovery); Magouirk v. Western Union Tel. Co.,
79 Miss. 632, 31 So. 206 (1902) (false telegram purporting to come from plaintiff to
a man-recovery). But of. Perry v. Moskins Stores, Inc., 249 S.W.2d 812 (Ky. 1952)
(postcard, "Please call WAbash 1492 and ask for Carolyn" held to be acceptable means
of advertising). See comment on the last case in 1953 U.C.L.A. INTAu,. L. REv. 75.
1099
1100 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [ VOL. 15
Peay v. Curtis Publishing Co.36 The Saturday Evening Post contained an
article on Washington taxi drivers entitled "Never Give a Passenger a
Break." It was a "caustic, merciless diatribe," depicting them as "ill-
mannered, brazen, and contemptuous of their patrons . . . dishonest and
cheating their customers when opportunity arises." As merely one of the
"defamed" group, plaintiff would not have been able to maintain an action,
but her picture was used, and this was held to indentify her sufficiently,
though her name was not used. She was permitted to recover for both
libel and invasion of the right of privacy. An article about waiters, with
plaintiff's picture, produced the same result in Valerni v. Hearst Magazines,
Inc.37 So also with an article in Front Page Detective entitled "Gang
Boy,"38 and an article in Tan entitled "Man Hungry."9 The first carried
a picture of several boys talking in front of a building, and the second
a picture of a professional model; neither had any connection with the
article.
Two similar cases make clear that it is not the publication of the
picture, but the false implication from its use with the article which gives
rise to the cause of action. In Leverton v. Curtis Publishing Co.,40 plaintiff,
as a 10-year-old child, had been involved in a street accident in Birming-
ham. A photographer took a very dramatic action picture of her being
lifted to her feet by a bystander, and the picture was widely used in
newspapers over the country. Twenty months later, the defendant pub-
lished in the Saturday Evening Post an article, "They Ask to Be Killed,"
about children and traffic hazards. The picture was included, next to a
box saying, "Do you invite massacre by your own carelessness? Here's
how thousands have committed suicide by scorning laws that were passed
to keep them alive." Recovery was allowed.4' In Gill v. Curtis Publishing
Co.,42 plaintiff's picture was used in an article entitled "Love" in the
36. 78 F. Supp. 305 (D.D.C. 1948).
37. 99 N.Y.S.2d 866 (Sup. Ct. 1949) (New York statute).
38. Metzger v. Dell Publishing Co., 207 Misc. 182, 136 N.Y.S.2d 888 (Sup. Ct.
1955).
39. Martin v. Johnson Publishing Co., 157 N.Y.S.2d 409 (Sup. Ct. 1956).
40. 192 F.2d 974 (3d Cir. 1951).
41. The court explained that while the accident was newsworthy, this use of the
picture had nothing to do with the accident. "It related to the general subject of
traffic accidents and pedestrian carelessness. Yet the facts, so far as we know them in
this case, show that the little girl, herself, was at the time of her accident not care-
less and the motorist was. The picture is used in connection with several headings
tending to say that this plaintiff narrowly escaped death because she was careless of
her own safety. That is not libelous; a count for defamation was dropped out in the
course of the trial. But we are not talking now about liability for defamation. We
are talking about the privilege to invade her interest in being left alone . . . . The sum
total of all this is that this particular plaintiff, the legitimate subject for publicity for
one particular accident, now becomes a pictorial, frightful example of pedestrian care-
lessness. This, we think, exceed the bounds of privilege." Id. at 978.
42. 38 Cal. 2d 273, 239 P.2d 630 (1952).
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Ladies Home Journal. Plaintiffs, husband and wife, were seated on stools
at the Farmer's Market in San Francisco, with the husband having his
arm around his wife and their cheeks touching. The court held in a
different case that there was no invasion of privacy in taking and publish-
ing this picture, since the plaintiff's took this voluntary pose in public and
there was nothing uncomplimentary or discreditable in the photograph it-
self.4 3 But underneath the picture in the Journal article on "Love" was the
caption, 'Tublicized as glamorous, desirable, 'love at first sight' is a bad
risk." This kind of love was classified as "100% sex attraction" and the
"wrong" kind. The court found that the implication given by the article
was that the plaintiffs were "persons whose only interest in each other is
sex, a characterization that may be said to impinge seriously upon their
sensibilities."44
In two cases, pictures were "doctored" or tampered with for advertise-
ment purposes. In Sinclair v. Postal Telegraph & Cable Co., 45 the com-
posite picture showed a professional actor in the act of notifying his
"enthusiastic admirers" by telegraph on a telegram of defendant company
that a motion picture of his was to be shown at a certain theater. The
court agreed that this presented him in an "undignified light." In Russell
v. Marboro Boocs46 the picture of plaintiff, a professional model, was made
into a bawdy composite picture advertising bedsheets. The court held
that action might lie both for violation of the New York statute and for
libel.47
In several cases it is indicated that a plaintiff's right of privacy is violated
when his photograph is kept in a police rogue's gallery when he has been
found not guilty of any criminal act.4
It is now well established that a newspaper does not commit an un-
warranted invasion of a person's right of privacy when it reports in a
straightforward fashion a newsworthy story; and the same is true of
articles of educational or informational value and of articles dealing with
43. Gill v. Hearst Publishing Co., 40 Cal. 2d 224, 253 P.2d 441 (1953) (Carter,
J., dissenting).
44. 239 P.2d at 634.
45. 72 N.Y.S.2d 841 (Sup. Ct. 1935).
46. 18 Misc. 2d 166, 183 N.Y.S.2d 8 (Sup. Ct. 1959).
47. Two other "picture cases" are appropriately cited here, though there is nothing
unusual in regard to them. Both involved stories in true detective magazines. Annerino
v. Dell Publishing Co., 17 IlM. App. 2d 205, 149 N.E.2d 761 (1958); Thompson v.
Close-up, Inc., 277 App. Div. 848, 98 N.Y.S.2d 300 (1950). See also Semler v.
Ultem Publications, Inc., 170 Misc. 551, 9 N.Y.S.2d 319 (City Ct. N.Y. 1938) (picture
of infant model, clad 'in negligee, put in magazine, Silk Stocking Stories).
48. Itzkovitch v. Whitaker, 115 La. 479, 39 So. 499 (1905). See also State ex rel.
Mavity v. Tyndall, 224 Ind. 364, 66 N.E.2d 755 (1946); Downs v. Swann, 111 Md.
53, 73 Ad. 653 (1909); Norman v. City of Las Vegas, 64 Nev. 38, 177 P.2d 442
(1947).
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public affairs of "public figures."49 A substantial number of cases have
indicated, however, that a cause of action does arise when the story is
dressed up in a sensational fashion and is "fictionalized-in other words,
when a false impression is created regarding the plaintiff. Thus in Garner
v. Triangle Publications, In. 50 where plaintiffs were initially convicted of
murder of the husband of one of the plaintiffs and the conviction was
later reversed, defendants' magazines carried numerous stories about it.
In denying defendants' motion for a summary judgment, the court said
that there would be no liability for giving of news or information but that
if defendants
enlarged upon the facts so as to go beyond the bounds of propriety and
decency, they should not be cloaked with and shielded by the public interest
in dissemination of "information." . . . It is no answer to say, as defendants
do, that such interests, if they exist, can be adequately compensated for
under the libel laws. If the articles violate rights of privacy, plaintiffs may
bring their action under the privacy laws also.51
In addition to detective magazines, 52 this approach has been applied to
newspaper Sunday magazines,53 filmsM4 and television programs. 55 The
extent to which there must be a variation from the true facts in order
to give rise to a cause of action is not clear. A mere allegation that a
story was fictionalized without setting out the parts which were false has
been held subject to demurrer. 6 Minor variations of fact were held not
to be significant or the basis for a cause of action when they appeared in
a biography,57 a movie magazine,5 a comic book,59 a newspaper column,60
49. The cases are very numerous. See generally Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L.
REv. 383, 410-15 (1960).
50. 97 F. Supp. 546 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
51. Id. at 550.
52. See Hazlitt v. Fawcett Publication, Inc., 116 F. Supp. 538 (D. Conn. 1953)
(murder trial); Reed v. Real Detective Publishing Co., 63 Ariz. 294, 162 P.2d 133
(1945).
53. Sutton v. Hearst, 277 App. Div. 155, 98 N.Y.S.2d 233 (1950), motion for leave
to appeal denied, 277 App. Div. 873, 98 N.Y.S.2d 589 (1950) ("sensationalized
version of facts embellished with matters drawn from the author's imagination"-
deceased turret gunner's bequest of "one perfect rose" a week to plaintiff); Aquino v.
Bulletin Co., 190 Pa. Super. 528, 154 A.2d 422 (1959) ("Marriage for spite"-"though
the facts of the article were admittedly true, the author embellished and fictionalized
them").
54. Binns v. Vitagraph Co. of America, 210 N.Y. 51, 103 N.E. 1108 (1913) (film
of wireless operator in wreck at sea); see Blumenthal v. Picture Classics, Inc., 235 App,
Div. 570, 257 N.Y. Supp. 800 (1932), aff'd mem., 261 N.Y. 504, 185 N.E. 713 (1933),
as explained in Sarat Lahiri v. Daily Mirror, Inc., 162 Misc. 776, 295 N.Y. Supp. 382,
388 (Sup. Ct. 1937).
55. Strickler v. National Broadcasting Co., 167 F. Supp. 68 (S.D. Cal. 1958)
(emergency plane landing at sea).
56. Stryker v. Republic Pictures Corp., 108 Cal. App. 2d 191, 238 P.2d 670
(Dist. Ct. App. 1951) (Marine Corps Medal of Honor winner, portrayed in the
movie, "The Sands of Iwo Jima").
57. Koussevitzky v. Allen, Towne & Heath, Inc., 188 Misc. 479, 68 N.Y.S.2d 779
[ VOL. 15
RIGHT OF PRIVACY
and a regular newspaper item.6 1 On the other hand, in Strickler v. National
Broadcasting Co.,62 involving a television film showing the part of a naval
commander in an emergency commercial plane landing at sea, where the
variations from truth were minor,63 the court denied a motion to dismiss,
holding that the question of whether the false items would be offensive
to a person of ordinary sensibilities was a question of fact for the jury.
6 4
Another group of cases holds that plaintiff's right of privacy may be
invaded by false statements even though they are oral and therefore to
be likened to slander rather than libel. In their original article Warren and
Brandeis had suggested that oral remarks should not be treated as in-
(Sup. Ct. 1947), aff'd, 272 App. Div. 759, 69 N.Y.S.2d 432 (1947) (biography of
symphony conductor "not fictional" and not repugnant to a reasonable sense of decency).
58. Carlisle v. Fawcett Publications, Inc., 20 Cal. Rptr. 405 (Dist. Ct. App. 1962)
(story about Janet Leigh; her first marriage to plaintiff set a year earlier to make her
14 instead of 15-no revelations of "intimate details which would tend to outrage public
decency").
59. Molony v. Boy Comics Publishers, Inc., 277 App. Div. 166, 98 N.Y.S.2d 119
(1950) (plaintiff's part in aiding the victims of the Empire State Building airplane
disaster--'minor discrepancies").
60. Middleton v. News Syndicate Co., 162 Misc. 516, 295 N.Y. Supp. 120 (Sup. Ct.
1937) (column, "The Inquiring Reporter," identified an unemployed model as a hotel
cigarette girl). See also Callas v. Whisper, Inc., 198 Misc. 829, 101 N.Y.S.2d 532
(Sup. Ct. 1950), affd mem., 278 App. Div. 974, 105 N.Y.S.2d 1001 (1951), aff'd
mem., 303 N.Y. 759, 103 N.E.2d 543 (1952) (picture of 19-year-old girl in night club).
And see Werner v. Times-Mirror Co., 193 Cal. App. 2d 111, 14 Cal. Rptr. 208, 213
Dist. Ct. App. 1961).
61. Jones v. Herald Post Co., 230 Ky. 227, 18 S.W.2d 972 (1929). While plaintiff
and her husband were walking down the street, two men assaulted and killed her
husband. The newspaper item quoted her as saying she fought with the men and tried
to kill them and that she would have revenge. Said the court: "We do not regard the
language attributed to Mrs. Jones as sufficient to add anything to her cause of action.
There was no intention to reflect on her. The account was intended to be compli-
mentary. The language attributed to her was such as might have been used by any
wife whose husband had been killed before her eyes. It would be going too far afield
to hold her up to contempt, hatred, scorn, or ridicule by her friends and acquaintances,
or the public in general." 18 S.W.2d at 973. Many of the other courts would disagree
with the result in this case, which reflects the Kentucky court's often indicated reluctance
to grant relief in this field.
See also Reardon v. News-Journal Co., 169 A.2d 263 (Del. 1960), involving a
newspaper item on the meeting of a Youth Services Commission where there was a
minor error. The court distinguishes a "legitimate news article" from one where "the
facts were so distorted and fictionalized that they did not constitute in the truest
sense a newspaper article at all but rather a fictionalized article ..... Id. at 267.
62. 167 F. Supp. 68 (S.D. Cal. 1958).
63. The film showed him out of uniform wearing a Hawaiian shirt, showed him smok-
ing a pipe and cigarettes, failed to show the assistance he received and showed him
in the act of praying.
64. In Donahue v. Warner Bros. Pictures Distrib. Co., 2 Utah 2d 256, 272 P.2d 177
(1954), the Utah statute was construed not to apply to a fictional portrayal of a
character in a biographical movie. Earlier, the federal court had construed it to
apply. Donahue v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 194 F.2d 6 (10th Cir. 1952).
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vasion.65 There have been several dicta to this effect, but with the excep-
tion of Kentucky cases, 66 the actual decisions have been otherwise.
In Bennett v. Norban,6" the assistant manager of defendant self-service
store, caught plaintiff, a customer, about twenty feet from the entrance
as she was leaving the store, and in an angry fashion ordered her to take
off her coat. When she did, he said, "What about your pockets?" and
reached into the pockets of her dress. Finding nothing, he seized her
purse, took everything out, looked in it, handed it back to her, mumbled
something and ran back into the store. All this was in the presence of other
persons. The court held that the trial court was wrong in sustaining pre-
liminary objections to counts of slander and invasion of the right of privacy.
It said that defendant's actions were "transitory gestures," so that slander
was appropriate, rather than libel. And it added:
[T]he privacy of a presumably innocent woman is invaded by a character
on the public highway that destroys her seclusion and subjects her to humilia-
tion by suggesting that she is a felon .... She had every right to prefer the
presumption of her innocence to its hostile demonstration.68
In Linehan v. Linehan,9 jury verdicts for plaintiff on counts of slander
and privacy were affirmed when the defendant, who had divorced her hus-
band, made repeated statements that she was his only lawful wife and that
plaintiff, his second wife, was cohabiting with him in sin.70 In Norris v.
Moskin Stores, Inc.,"7 defendant sought to collect an alleged debt by ar-
65. Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HAuv. L. REv. 193, 217 (1890):
"The law would probably not grant any redress for the invasion of privacy by oral
publication in the absence of special damage . . . . The injury resulting from such
oral communications would ordinarily be so trifling that the law might well, in the
interest of free speech, disregard it altogether."
66. The leading case is Pangallo v. Murphy, 243 S.W.2d 496 (Ky. 1951). Plaintiff
and her family had been renting two furnished rooms from defendant. While plaintiff
was in the hospital, defendant removed all their personal belongings to a shed, went
to the hospital and in the presence of others, told her he had removed them, saying:
"You and your family are not fit persons to live in the house; you are filthy and dirty
and the rooms were filthy and dirty and I didn't want you and your family in the
house." Despite physical consequences, the court held there could be no recovery for
slander or invasion of the right of privacy. "[T]here can be no grant of redress for
the invasion of the right of privacy by oral publications." See also Gregory v. Bryan-
Hunt Co., 295 Ky. 345, 174 S.W.2d 510 (1943). And see McKown v. Great Ad. &
Pac. Tea Co., 99 Ga. App. 120, 107 S.E.2d 883 (1959).
67. 396 Pa. 94, 151 A.2d 476 (1959).
68. 151 A.2d at 479. Cf. Sutherland v. Kroger Co., 144 W. Va. 673, 110 S.E.2d 716
(1959).
69. 134 Cal. App. 2d 250, 285 P.2d 326 (Dist. Ct. App. 1955).
70. The court declared that there were no questions of law involved, only one of
evidence. See also Carr v. Watkins, 227 Md. 578, 177 A.2d 841 (1962), where de-
fendants were charged with telling plaintiff's employer that he had been discharged
from a previous employment for molesting children and drunkenness, when he had been
exonerated of the charges.
71. 272 Ala. 174, 132 So. 2d 321 (1961).
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ranging for a woman calling herself Doris to telephone (1) plaintiff's wife,
speaking of her dates with plaintiff in Indiana and her need to speak with
him privately, and (2) plaintiff's sister-in-law, to say that she was "in
trouble" and didn't know plaintiff was married when she dealt with him.
The court expressly held that a privacy action would lie for oral statements
and that these fell "beyond the realm of reasonable action and into the
area of wrongful and actionable intrusion."1 2
A final case also involved an attempt to collect a debt. In Biedermanws
of Springfield, Inc. v. Wright,73 defendant's agent appeared in a restaurant
where plaintiff was a waitress and said loudly, "I think you're deadbeats-I
don't think you intended to pay for the furniture when you got it." The
court held that action for invasion of the right of privacy might be main-
tained and indicated that it made no difference whether the charge made
in the oral statement was true or false.
From a cumulative standpoint, this group of cases presents an impressive
total. For the contrary position the authority is comparatively slight. The
only case which is expressly contrary is Gregory v. Bryan-Hunt Co.7 4
Defendant made an oral charge that certain cigarettes in plaintiff's store
were stolen; the court sustained a demurrer to an action for invasion of the
right of privacy, saying that such an action "is restricted to matters
peculiarly personal, private, seclusive, as distinguished from such wrongs
as libel, slander, trespass or injury to property, assault, etc., for which
there are other remedies."75 But Kentucky has taken a very restricted view
of the right of privacy. The court has held that oral statements are not the
basis for a cause of action,7 6 and, indeed, so held in the Gregory case; thus,
72. 132 So. 2d at 325. Cf. Bowden v. Spiegal, Inc., 96 Cal. App. 2d 793, 216 P.
2d 571 (Dist. Ct. App. 1950), where phone calls for collection purposes were held to
constitute an intentional infliction of mental suffering and probably also an invasion of
the right of privacy. See Smith & Straske, Collection Procedures and Right of Privacy,
36 FLA. B.J. 1085 (1962).
73. 322 S.W.2d 892 (Mo. 1959).
74. 295 Ky. 345, 174 S.W.2d 510 (1943).
75. 174 S.W.2d at 512. The court continued: "While it may be true that a right
of action for violation of privacy may incidentally include some of the elements in-
cluded in the other class of actions mentioned above, yet there is a line of distinction,
though close in some instances, which must be kept in mind .... In no event . . .
was such right ever intended as a substitute or alternative remedy for the invasion or
violation of rights for which other known and established remedies are available."
76. There was a dictum to this effect in Brents v. Morgan, 221 Ky. 765, 299 S.W.
967 (1927). It was so held in the.instant case, and also later in Pangallo v. Murphy,
243 S.W.2d 496 (Ky. 1951), a case which it seems would have been particularly
appropriate for a privacy action. For facts, see note 66 supra. Other unusually
restrictive Kentucky decisions are Jones v. Herald Post Co., 230 Ky. 227, 18 S.W.2d
972 (1929) and Perry v. Moskins Stores, Inc., 249 S.W.2d 812 (Ky. 1952); cf. Walker
v. Tucker, 220 Ky. 363, 295 S.W. 138 (.1927) (slander).
It is noteworthy that Kentucky has had so many privacy decisions desjite its
restrictive view. Sometimes such a view produces more appellate cases because of




the quoted statement may be regarded as a dictum.
Another case which might be cited as contrary is the Seventh Circuit
decision of Estill v. Hearst Publishing Co.,7 7 but the court gave no real
attention to the possible application of a privacy action to misstatements
of fact.78 Reference may also be made to a statement in a Georgia inter-
mediate court,79 and cases in two jurisdictions before the right of privacy
had there been given clear recognition. 80
On balance the weight of authority is therefore clearly to the effect
that an action for invasion of the right of privacy can be maintained for
false statements about the plaintiff.
On the merits this is as it should be. As the Missouri Supreme Court
seems to suggest in a recent case,81 when the action is for invasion of the
right of privacy the court should not find it necessary to inquire into the
truth or falsity of the statement.8 To force a plaintiff to prove that the
77. 186 F.2d 1017 (7th Cir. 1951).
78. The Chicago Herald-American ran a series of articles on John Dillinger many
years after his death. One of them had a picture of plaintiff with his arm around
Dillinger. Dillinger had been captured and placed in jail in a county where plaintiff
was prosecuting attorney; later Dillinger escaped. The story called plaintiff a victim
of the "Dillinger curse" and said falsely that he had been laughed out of office and
died a broken man. The court held that a libel count was good against a demurrer but
not one for invasion of the right of privacy. On the latter it declared that plaintiff was
a public figure and the story did not give an unwarranted publicity to his "private
affairs and activities." No reference of any kind was made to the misstatements of
fact in this connection.
79. McKown v. Great At. & Pac. Tea Co., 99 Ga. App. 120, 107 S.E.2d 883, 886-87
(1959): "[S]ince all slander cases necessarily involve the right of privacy against
slander the right of privacy is involved but the gist of the action is still slander in
such cases and not invasion of privacy." Cf. Freeman v. Busch Jewelry Co., 98 F. Supp.
963 (N.D. Ga. 1951) (not necessary to decide whether cause of action is for libel or
invasion of the right of privacy). But cf. Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 122
Ga. 190, 50 S.E. 68 (1905); Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Vandergriff, 52 Ga. App.
662, 184 S.E. 452 (1936).
80. In Thayer v. Worcester Post Co., 284 Mass. 160, 187 N.E. 292 (1933), plaintiff
sued her husband for divorce and he sued his chauffeur for alienation of affections.
Defendant paper took a picture of several people, cut out those of the plaintiff and
the chauffeur and carried the picture of the two, with the words, "Principals in local
divorce scandal." The court held that an action for libel would lie but one for
invasion of the right of privacy would not. The discussion on privacy was confined to
the use of the picture and the right to be let alone. See the later recognition of the
right in Themo v. New England Newspaper Publishing Co., 306 Mass. 54, 27 N.E.2d
753 (1940).
In Martin v. F.I.Y. Theatre Co., 10 Ohio Op. 338 (C.P. 1938), defendant burlesque
theater displayed the picture of plaintiff, an actress "of high reputation," on the front
of the theater between "nude and lewd" pictures of burlesque actresses. The court
held that a count in libel could stand, but not one for invasion of the right of privacy.
Discussion on the latter was that plaintiff, as a "public character ...cannot complain
that any right of privacy is trespassed upon by the mere unauthorized publication of a
photograph." See the later recognition of the right in Housh v. Peth, 165 Ohio St. 35,
133 N.E.2d 340 (1956).
See also Chaplin v. National Broadcasting Co., 15 F.R.D. 134 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
81. Biederman's of Springfield, Inc. v. Wright, 322 S.W.2d 892, 898 (Mo. 1959).
82. Compare the statement by Warren and Brandeis: "Obviously this branch of the
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offensive statement about him was true in order to maintain an action is to
create an anomaly of the worst sort; and to put him in a position where
he must choose in advance an action in privacy or one in defamation
depending on whether he guesses the court will find the statement true or
false is to resort to the rigid pleading of the early days of the forms of
action. Suppose that the offensive statement is an exaggeration of a true
occurrence or a complex of true and false assertions;' should the plaintiff
be required to bring separate actions?83 As one commentator puts it, "The
gist of the wrong is public disclosure. Inasmuch as factually true incidents
and those which are falsely attributed to an individual are both communi-
cated to the public as genuine occurrences, they should be treated in the
same way."
8 4
To the argument that this will produce a duplication of actions and of
damages the answer should be apparent. The available damages should
be complete, but not duplicative. They should compensate for both the
mental distress and the injury to reputation. Whether this is done by fact
pleading for a single action, by separate counts in a single complaint, or by
completely separate action depends upon the rules of pleading in the
particular jurisdiction. In no event should damages be awarded twice for
the mental suffering. It is true that the legal right of privacy was evolved
by the common law to fill in certain gaps previously existing. But in the
development of the logical scope of the principle involved it should not be
limited to pre-existing gaps.
The conclusion is therefore justified by both precedent and reason that
a right of privacy action may be maintained in the so-called "false light"
cases. The question still remains as to the particular attributes of this group
of cases and their relationship to the other privacy cases. What kind of
false statement will be actionable? Need it be defamatory? The cases
indicate that the answer to this is no. It may be defamatory but need not
law should have no concern with the truth of [sic] falsehood of the matters published.
It is not for injury to the individual's character that redress or prevention is sought, but
for injury to the right of privacy. For the former, the law of slander and libel provides
perhaps a sufficient safeguard. The latter implies the right not merely to prevent
inaccurate portrayal of private life, but to prevent its being depicted at all." Warren
& Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 IAv. L. REv. 193, 218 (1890).
83. Cf., Hazlitt v. Fawcett Publications, Inc., 116 F. Supp. 538 (D. Conn. 1953),
where action was brought for a fictionalized story of a murder trial in a detective
magazine. The court held that the statute of limitations had run on the defamatory
statements but not on the ones which merely involved the right of privacy.
84. Spiegel, Public Celebrity v. Scandal Magazine-The Celebrity's Right to Privacy,
30 So. CAL. L. R-v. 280, 291 (1957). Other parts of the same comment: "Truth
obviously is not a defense. By the same token, falsity should not be a defense. A
publication which exaggerates the incidents depicted may well aggravate the offense to
sensibilities. Falsely attributed conduct of a private nature can be equally offensive....
Both [true and false statements] may cause humiliation and embarrassment, impinge
upon dignity and self-respect, offend the ordinary sensibilities of ordinary people."
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be.85 Should it be one which would be actionable even if true? There has
been no discussion of the problem from this angle. The Restatement of
Torts at present speaks of one who "unreasonably and seriously interferes
with another's interest."8 6 The cases have spoken of matter which would
be offensive to a person of ordinary sensibilities.8 7 Either formula ade-
quately takes care of this question, without more. The truth or falsity of
the statement is simply one of the factors to be weighed in applying the
formula.
But there is one area where the falsity of the statement may make a
substantial difference. It is generally agreed that a "public figure" or a
person having connection with a newsworthy event which is in the public
interest, cannot claim that his right of privacy has been unreasonably
invaded when publicity is given by a true description of the matters of
public interest.8 But suppose there are false statements. The question thus
posed was stated in a recent California case
as being whether a person who has theretofore acquired the status of a
public personage may claim an invasion of his right of privacy when a news-
paper publishes an article about him, the subject matter of which is written
within the general scope of what is understood to be within the public
domain, if such article contains false or misleading statements which cause
him emotional distress but no special damages.8 9
The answer indicated by the decided cases is that the "privilege" of pub-
lishing matters of public interest does not extend to false statements, so
that even a public personage or a person connected with a newsworthy
event can maintain an action if the false statement is one which would
offend a person of ordinary sensibilities.90
85. Thus, it was held to be defamatory in Reed v. Real Detective Publishing Co., 63
Ariz. 294, 162 P.2d 133 (1945); Linehan v. Linehan, 134 Cal. App. 2d 250, 285 P.2d
326 (Dist. Ct. App. 1955); Bennett v. Norban, 396 Pa. 94, 151 A.2d 476 (1959). It
was held not to be defamatory in Leverton v. Curtis Publishing Co., 192 F.2d 974 (3d
Cir. 1951); Flake v. Greensboro News Co., 212 N.C. 780, 195 S.E. 55 (1938).
86. RESTATE MENT, ToaTs § 867 (1939).
87. See, e.g., Leverton v. Curtis Publishing Co., 192 F.2d 974 (3d Cir. 1951);
Strickler v. National Broadcasting Co., 167 F. Supp. 68 (S.D. Cal. 1958); Carlisle v.
Fawcett Publications, Inc., 20 Cal. Rptr. 405 (Dist. Ct. App. 1962) ("restricted to
'ordinary sensibilities' and not to supersensitivities or agoraphobia"); Prosser, Privacy,
48 CALIw. L. R1Ev. 383, 396 (1960).
88. See, e.g., Sidis v. F-R Publishing Corp., 113 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1940), cert.
denied, 311 U.S. 711 (1940); Samuel v. Curtis Publishing Co., 122 F. Supp. 327 (N.D.
Cal. 1954); Gill v. Hearst Publishing Co., 40 Cal. 2d 224, 253 P.2d 441 (1953); Jacova
v. Southern Radio & Tel. Co., 83 So. 2d 34 (Fla. 1955); Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALw.
L. REv. 383, 410-15 (1960).
89. Werner v. Times-Mirror Co., 193 Cal. App. 2d 111, 14 Cal. Rptr. 208, 213 (Dist.
Ct. App. 1961), 50 CAiaF. L. REv. 357 (1962). The court held the retraction statute
to be applicable, so that failure to comply with it disposed of the cause of action;
and it therefore did not attempt to answer the question.
90. See the cases cited in notes 50-64 supra and the accompanying text.
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III. APPLICATION OF DEFAMATION BESTIRICTIONS TO PRIVACY ACTIONS
During the lengthy course of its development, the law of defamation has
produced many restrictions, limitations, and defenses. Some of them are
historical relics serving little useful purpose today, and have been the
object of severe criticism. Some are recent developments, either judicial
or statutory. Some developed through an attempt to keep control of juries
in the hands of the trial judge. Others came about in an effort to prevent
the bringing of trivial actions. Still others are the outcome of the desire
to protect freedom of speech and of the press. Often a particular restriction
is the result of several of these reasons. Which restrictions should be
treated as applicable to privacy actions-particularly the false-statement
cases? A detailed consideration seems to be indicated.
The first difference to be noted is so obvious that it is listed out of its
logical order. Truth is a defense to an action for libel or slander.91 It is
not a defense to an action for invasion of the right of privacy.92
There is little difference in the two torts in the requirement of publica-
tion. It has been urged that, at least so far as disclosure of embarrassing
private facts is concerned, publicity or public disclosure to more than one
person or a small group is required for a privacy action9 The cases cited
for the contention are all explained on other grounds, however,94 and the
requirement, if it is held to exist, will probably have less basis in the
false-statement cases. There seem to be no privacy cases specifically dis-
cussing the matter of repetition or secondary publication.95 Defamation
holdings seem properly analogous. At least one case holds that the recently
developed single-publication rule in defamation96 should be applied to
91. The cases are many. See GATLEY, LmEL AND SLANDER § 254 (5th ed. 1960);
Nmw=r, SLANDEn AND LBEL § 696 (4th ed. 1924); Harnett & Thornton, The Truth
Hurts: A Critique of a Defense to Defamation, 35 VA. L. REv. 425 (1949); Ray,
Truth: A Defense to Libel, 16 MInN. L. REV. 43 (1931).
92. Again, the cases are numerous. Indeed, the law of privacy developed to fill
this gap in the law of defamation. See Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4
HAv. L. REv. 193, 218 (1890). For representative cases, see Cason v. Baskin, 155
Fla. 198, 20 So. 2d 243 (1944); Barber v. Time, Inc., 348 Mo. 1199, 159 S.W.2d 291
(1942).
93. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAIiF. L. REv. 383, 393 (1960).
94. The single-person cases are all ones where a creditor communicated with a
debtor's employer in an effort to collect a debt. The conduct was therefore not an
unreasonable invasion of privacy. See note 122 infra. The small-group case was the
Kentucky case of Gregory v. Bryan-Hunt Co., 295 Ky. 345, 174 S.W.2d 510 (1943).
It involved oral statements which Kentucky has held not to be actionable in a privacy
action, and the court based its holdings on the ground that the right of privacy cannot
be used to duplicate other remedies. See note 74 supra and corresponding text.
95. See Barber v. Time, Inc., 348 Mo. 1199, 159 S.W.2d 291 (1942), where the
news magazine was held liable for picking up a newspaper story, erroneously assuming
that consent had been given to publish it. In Reed v. Real Detective Publishing Co.,
63 Ariz. 294, 162 P.2d 133 (1945), a news agent was held liable for selling a
magazine containing an article held to invade plaintiff's right of privacy.
96. See Gregoire v. G. P. Putnam's Sons, 298 N.Y. 119, 81 N.E.2d 45 (1948);
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privacy.9 It is significant that the Uniform Single Publications Statute
refers both to defamation and the right of privacy.98
Defamation is normally an intentional tort, but there has developed a
peculiar sort of strict liability which will hold the defendant without regard
to intent or negligenceP 9 The extent to which this strict liability is im-
ported into the law of privacy is not clear. Several cases holding the
defendant liable when he thought he had consent are not truly indica-
tive.100 Even in the intentional tort of battery, a mistake as to consent or
privilege is no defense.1 1 Two California cases declare that "inadvertance
or mistake is no defense where the publication does in fact refer to the
plaintiff in such a manner as to violate his right of privacy."102 These cases
and this statement may be the basis for applying the strict liability of
defamation, though they are clearly distinguishable. In both, the defendant
was so grossly negligent that it amounted to reckless conduct. 103 On
PnossEn, TORTS § 94, at 599 (2d ed. 1955); Leflar, The Single Publication Rule, 25
Roc -y MT. L. REv. 263 (1953).
97. Fouts v. Fawcett Publication, Inc., 116 F. Supp. 535, 537 (D. Conn. 1953):
"The only reasonable conclusion is that any state which adopts the single publication
rule for purposes of the tort of libel, would also adopt it and apply it, with the
same test as to the date of accrual, in cases of wrongful violations of the right of
privacy. I so hold." See also, Hazlitt v. Fawcett Publications, Inc., 116 F. Supp. 538
(D. Conn. 1953). The problem is recognized by the court but not decided in Lever-
ton v. Curtis Publishing Co., 192 F.2d 974 (3d Cir. 1951).
98. UNIFORM SnGLE PuBLICATIONs AcT (1952). Section one provides: "No person
shall have more than one cause of action for damages for libel or slander or invasion of
privacy or any other tort founded upon any single publication or exhibition or
utterance. See Hull v. Curtis Publishing Co., 182 Pa. Super. 86, 125 A.2d 644
(1956).
99. See 1 HuPER & JAmEs, TORTS § 5.5 (1956); PnossEn, TORTS § 94 (2d ed.
1955).
100. Foster-Milburn Co. v. Chinn, 134 Ky. 424, 120 S.W. 364 (1909) (indorsement
of medicine believed to have come from plaintiff-mitigation of damages if defendant
acted in good faith); Barber v. Time, Inc., 348 Mo. 1199, 159 S.W.2d 291 (1942)
(defendant took embarrassing story from newspaper, assuming consent-liability, but
no punitive damages); Myers v. U.S. Camera Publishing Corp., 9 Misc. 2d 765,
167 N.Y.S.2d 771 (N.Y. City Ct. 1957) (defendant thought agent obtained consent-
"grossly negligent and reckless to publish a full body photograph of a nude woman
revealing her identity without her written consent"); Flake v. Greensboro News Co., 212
N.C. 780, 195 S.E. 55 (1938). In Harlow v. Buno Co., 36 Pa. D. & C. 101 (1939),
the court held for the defendant when it published a picture, misled by a forged
consent, saying "the invasion must be intentional and.., the defendant must knowingly
publish the photograph of plaintiff without authority."
101. PRossEa, TORTS § 17 (2d ed. 1955); see Whittier, Mistake in the Law of Torts,
15 HAnv. L. REV. 335 (1902).
102. Fairfield v. American Photocopy Equip. Co., 138 Cal. App. 2d 82, 291 P.2d 195,
197 (Dist. Ct. App. 1955); Kerby v. Hal Roach Studios, Inc., 53 Cal. App. 2d 207, 127
P.2d 577, 581 (Dist. Ct. App. 1942). See also Thompson v. Close-up, Inc., 277 App.
Div. 848, 98 N.Y.S.2d 300 (1950); Flake v. Greensboro News Co., 212 N.C. 780, 195
S.E. 55 (1938) (nominal damages granted when photograph used by mistake).
103. In Fairfield defendant listed plaintiff in an advertisement as being a satisfied
user of its machine, without consent, and despite the fact that plaintiff had returned
the machine as being unsatisfactory. In Kerby, defendant had used plaintiff's name
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principle, it would appear that protection of the right of privacy need not
extend beyond negligent acts, and that the tort might well be regarded
as an intentional one. The concept of technical malice which has plagued
the law of defamation has fortunately not made its appearance in the
privacy cases. Similarly, an allegation of express malice does not create
liability when the statement is not otherwise actionable. 04
When it comes to the actionable character of the statement or communi-
cation, the standard is expressed somewhat differently for defamation and
privacy. To be defamatory a statement must expose the plaintiff to hatred,
ridicule, or contempt of other people. The Restatement declares that the
expression must tend so to harm his "reputation as to lower him in the
estimation of the community or to deter third persons from associating or
dealing with him."10 5 The standard for invasion of the right of privacy is
phrased in terms of the effect of the statement on the plaintiff, himself,
and indicates that it must be offensive to him. But the standard is still not
subjective; the courts speak of the requireilient that it be offensive to a
person of ordinary sensibilities. 106 Despite the different way of stating the
two tests, in the case of a false statement they seem quite likely to reach
the same result. Certainly it would appear that a statement which holds
him up to hatred, ridicule, or contempt would offend the sensibilities of
an ordinary, reasonable person.
The distinction between oral and written statements in the law of defa-
mation has no counterpart in the law of privacy. Following Warren and
Brandeis, 10 7 a few courts have held or suggested that an action for invasion
of the right of privacy will not lie for oral statements, 108 but the great
(Marion Kerby) on a purportedly salacious private letter sent as an advertising scheme
to many persons, when it could have discovered plaintiff's name in the telephone
directory.
In the new draft of the Restatement liability for intentional infliction of mental
suffering is held to apply to intentional or reckless conduct. See REsTATExmNT
(SEcoND), ToRTs § 46 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1957).
104. See, e.g., Sidis v. F-R Publishing Corp., 113 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1940), cert.
denied, 311 U.S. 711 (1940); Berg v. Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co., 79 F. Supp. 957
(D. Minn. 1948); Meetze v. Associated Press, 230 S.C. 330, 95 S.E.2d 606 (1956).
105. REsTATE,%MT, ToRTs § 559 (1938). Comment e explains that the statement
need not prejudice him in the eyes of all the community or even a majority of it.
"It is enough that the communication tend to prejudice him in the eyes of a substantial
and respectable minority of them .... "
106. See, e.g., Samuel v. Curtis Publishing Co., 122 F. Supp. 327 (N.D. Cal. 1954);
Bernstein v. National Broadcasting Co., 129 F. Supp. 817 (D.D.C. 1955), aff'd mem.,
232 F.2d 369 (D.C. Cir. 1956); Harms v. Miami Daily News, Inc., 127 So. 2d 715
(Fla. App. 1961); Davis v. General Fin. & Thrift Corp., 80 Ga. App. 708, 57 S.E.2d
225 (1950). In Perry v. Moskins Stores, Inc., 249 S.W.2d 812 (Ky. 1952) the standard
is said to be that of a reasonable man.
107. Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HAnv. L. REv. 193, 217 (1890).
108. E.g., Pangallo v. Murphy, 243 S.W.2d 496 (Ky. 1951); see Cason v. Baskin,
155 Fla. 198, 20 So. 2d 243 (1944).
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majority have held otherwise. 109 There has been no inclination to import
into privacy the distinction between slander per se and slander which
requires proof of special damage. If a communication invades the right
of privacy at all, it offends the plaintiff's sensibilities and causes him mental
distress-the injury for which compensation is given." 0 This is, therefore,
one of the defamation restrictions which can be avoided by bringing an
action for invasion of the right of privacy."'
As for the measure of damages in general, it would appear that there is
little difference in the two torts. In defamation the prime basis of the
cause of action is damage to reputation, but if the action can be maintained
the plaintiff can recover for resulting emotional distress." 2 In a privacy
action the plaintiff recovers primarily for the emotional distress, but also for
the harm to his interest in privacy, and this would appear to include
damage to his reputation."13 There is no difference between the two torts
as to punitive damages.
It is on the subject of privileges that the most difficult single decision
regarding the right of privacy must be made. In the law of defamation,
the plaintiff makes a prima facie case when he establishes the defendant's
publication to a third person of a statement defamatory of the plaintiff.
The defendant may then present as a matter of defense that the occasion
was privileged because the ends to be gained by permitting the statement
outweigh the harm which may be done to the plaintiff." 4 The privilege
may be "absolute" or it may be "conditional," in which case it may be
exceeded or abused and the defendant still be liable. The intricate mixture
109. E.g., Norris v. Moskin Stores, Inc., 272 Ala. 174, 132 So. 2d 321 (1961);
Bowden v. Spiegel, Inc., 96 Cal. App. 2d 793, 216 P.2d 571 (Dist. Ct. App. 1950);
Carr v. Watldns, 227 Md. 578, 177 A.2d 841 (1962); Biederman's of Springfield, Inc.
v. Wright, 322 S.W.2d 892 (Mo. 1959); Bennett v. Norban, 396 Pa. 94, 151 A.2d
476 (1959).
110. Numerous cases indicate that special damages are not necessary in order to
maintain an action for violation of the right of privacy. See, e.g., Norris v. Moskin
Stores, Inc., 272 Ala. 174, 132 So. 2d 321 (1961); Fairfield v. American Photocopy
Equip. Co., 138 Cal. App. 2d 82, 291 P.2d 194 (Dist. Ct. App. 1955); Pavesich v.
New England Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190, 50 S.E. 68 (1905); Continental Optical
Co. v. Reed, 119 Ind. App. 643, 86 N.E.2d 306 (1949).
111. Thus, in Norris v. Moskin Stores, Inc., 272 Ala. 174, 132 So. 2d 321 (1961), the
plaintiff, a man, was permitted to recover for invasion of the right of privacy, %vhen
the defendant, seeking to collect a debt, made telephone calls to his wife and sister-
in-law implying sexual misconduct. But the same court had previously held in
Marion v. Davis, 217 Ala. 16, 114 So. 357 (1927) that an action of slander would not
lie for imputing unchastity to a man, in the absence of proof of special damages.
112. RESTATFmENT, TORTS § 623 (1938).
113. Special damages can be shown. See, e.g., Freeman v. Busch Jewelry Co., 98
F. Supp. 963 (N.D. Ga. 1951); Continental Optical Co. v. Reed, 119 Ind. App. 643,
86 N.E. 2d 306 (1949); Foster-Milburn Co. v. Chinn, 134 Ky. 424, 120 S.W. 364
(1909). On damages for invasion of the right of privacy in general see Prosser, Privacy,
48 CALwF. L. BExv. 383, 409 (1960).
114. RESTATEmENT, TORTS, Introductory Note ch. 25, Title B, at 223-25 (1938). See
PRossxu, TORTS § 95, at 606-07 (2d ed. 1955).
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of rules on privilege to defame is very confusing and involved, but it
generally affords a means for judge or jury to balance properly the con-
flicting interests involved. In the law of negligence on the other hand,
there is no talk of privilege at all. The plaintiff must show that the
defendant's conduct created an unreasonable risk which caused injury to
him-that the defendant's conduct was not that of a reasonable, prudent
man. The same opportunity to balance conflicting social interests is
presented, and it is done in a much simpler, cleaner fashion. Do the
authorities indicate the adoption of either of these approaches? Which of
the two approaches is better for handling the right-of-privacy cases?
A first reaction would be that privacy law is nearer defamation law
since it involves language and that the privilege approach should be used.
Indeed, in their famous article, Warren and Brandeis list this as one of the
attributes of the tort.115 There are cases which quote or repeat this state-
ment.116 It is generally agreed that a cause of action for violation of the
right of privacy will not lie for publication of legitimate news or matter of
public interest. Frequently, this is called a privilege," 7 and it is sometimes
expressly likened to the qualified privilege in defamation.18
But there is substantial authority the other way. In Themo v. New
England Newspaper Publishing Co.,119 a newspaper published a picture of
plaintiff talking with the captain of police. The court held that a demurrer
was properly sustained to the declaration since the occasion might have
been one in which the readers had a legitimate public interest. This was
not negatived in the declaration, which "stated no case unless the plaintiffs
under all conceivable circumstances had an absolute legal right to exclude
from a newspaper any photograph of them taken without their permis-
sion."120 In the first case expressly recognizing the right of privacy, the
115. "The right to privacy does not prohibit the communication of any matter,
though in its nature private, when the publication is made under circumstances which
would render it a privileged communication according to the law of slander and
libel." Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HAiiv. L. REV. 193, 216 (1890).
116. See, e.g., Hubbard v. Journal Publishing Co., 69 N.M. 473, 368 P.2d 147 (1962)
(court record); Johnson v. Scripps Publishing Co., 18 Ohio Op. 372, 32 Ohio L. Abs.
423 (C.P. 1940) (public nomination petition).
117. E.g., Jenkins v. Dell Publishing Co., 251 F.2d 447 (3d Cir. 1958); Samuel v.
Curtis Publishing Co., 122 F. Supp. 327 (N.D. Cal. 1954); Jacova v. Southern Radio
& Tel. Co., 83 So. 2d 34 (Fla. 1955).
118. See Barber v. Time, Inc., 348 Mo. 1199, 159 S.W.2d 291, 295 (1942) ("The
determination of what is a matter of public concern is similar in principle to qualified
privilege in libel"). See also Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REv. 383, 410-15, 421
(1960).
119. 306 Mass. 54, 27 N.E.2d 753 (1940).
120. 306 Mass. at 58, 27 N.E.2d at 755. A similar attitude seems to be indicated
in Stryker v. Republic Pictures Corp., 108 Cal. App. 2d 191, 238 P.2d 670 (Dist. Ct.
App. 1951). Compare Langford v. Vanderbilt Univ., 199 Tenn. 389, 287 S.W.2d 32
(1956), where a college newspaper set forth a declaration in an action brought against a
college "humor magazine." Action was brought for libel and invasion of the right
of privacy. The court held there was a conditional privilege, in the libel action to
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court said that the right "can not be said to have been invaded by one
who speaks or writes or prints, provided the reference to such person and
the manner in which he is referred to is reasonably and legitimately proper
in an expression of opinion on the subject that is under investigation."121
Several courts have held that the test as to whether a creditor is liable in
a privacy action for disclosing the debt is whether he took reasonable
action under the circumstances,122 and another court has used the same
test in connection with advertising.123 Several courts point out that the
recovery is not for invasion of the right of privacy, but for an "unreason-
able" or "unwarranted" invasion of the right of privacy; 24 the implication
is that the plaintiff must show that the invasion is unreasonable or unwar-
ranted.
On balance, support must be given to the "negligence approach" and
the position taken that the plaintiff in a privacy action must allege and
establish facts to show that there was an unwarranted invasion of his right
of privacy. Defamation cases on privilege would be relevant and persua-
publish the pleading, and sent the case back for a trial on abuse of the privilege
because of malice or partial report. As to the privacy count, however, it held outright
that there was no invasion in publishing a matter of public record. No reference was
made to privilege or abuse of privilege.
121. Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190, 204, 50 S.E. 68, 73, 74
(1905). Compare the test applied under the actionable words statute in Mississippi
in Cooper v. Davidson, 172 Miss. 74, 157 So. 418, 419 (1935) ("if the occasion is such
as to render it necessary or proper for the use of the words, they are not actionable,
if used in good faith and without any intention to insult").
122. Not liable: Cunningham v. Securities Inv. Co., 278 F.2d 600, 604 (5th Cir.
1960), rehearing denied, 281 F.2d 439 (5th Cir. 1960) ("right to take reasonable, that
is non-oppressive, action to pursue his debtor and persuade payment, although the steps
taken may result in actual but not actionable invasion of the debtor's privacy"); Gould-
man-Taber Pontiac, Inc. v. Zerbst, 213 Ga. 682, 100 S.E.2d 881 (1957) (letter to
debtor's employer held ordinary and reasonable step). Liable: Norris v. Moskin Stores,
Inc., 272 Ala. 174, 132 So. 2d 321 (1961) ("What constitutes 'reasonable' action must
depend largely on the facts of the particular case"-conduct here "cannot be justified
as reasonably related to a legitimate effort to collect the debt"); Housh v. Peth, 165
Ohio St. 35, 133 N.E.2d 340 (1956) (creditor has right to take reasonable steps,
but action here unreasonable).
In Yoder v. Smith, 112 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 1962), defendant collection agency was
held not liable for writing a letter to plaintiff's employer seeking collection of a debt.
The majority opinion indicated that this was not an invasion of the plaintiff's right
of privacy because the employer had a "natural and proper interest in the debts of his
employees" and defendant had taken "reasonable action." A specially concurring
opinion spoke of a "limitation" on the right of privacy but found it unnecessary to
decide whether it was "a qualified privilege, a qualified exception or a restricted right."
It subsequently called it a qualified privilege.
123. Perry v. Moskins Stores, Inc., 249 S.W.2d 812, 814 (Ky. 1952), 1953 U.C.L.A.
INRaA. L. REv. 75: "Modem day advertising techniques have come to be acceptable
and are in effect a limitation on the individual's right of privacy. Such methods are not
actionable so long as they are not unreasonable."
124. See, e.g., Gouldman-Taber Pontiac, Inc., v. Zerbst, 213 Ga. 682, 100 S.E.2d
881 (1957); Voneye v. Turner, 240 S.W.2d 588, 590 (Ky. 1951).
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sive in determining whether or not there was an unwarranted invasion,124a
but they would not be controlling. 25 Accepting this viewpoint would
provide a reform, eliminating some of the unnecessarily complicated rami-
fications of the law of defamation, and at the same time would appear
to pose in a clearer and more intelligible fashion the need of balancing
the conflicting social interests involved. It would also eliminate the com-
plexities in the law of defamation about the burden of proof,12S and in
accordance with the Themo case127 would place the burden on the plaintiff
on all matters except the aTmative defenses like consent and the statute
of limitations.
This approach would also leave in a simple form the rules about relative
functions of judge and jury in the privacy cases.128 At present the courts
appear to be well in agreement that in privacy cases the question of
whether the communications would be offensive to a person of ordinary
124a. Obviously the policy on which a privilege in defamation is based may be so
important that it will apply also in a privacy action. This is particularly true of the
absolute privileges or immunities. Thus, in Carr v. Watkins, 227 Md. 578, 177 A.2d
841 (1962), the court held that the executive privilege of executive officers applies
also to an action for invasion of the right of privacy and to an action for conspiracy to
terminate plaintiff's employment. The policy behind the immunity was "that the
benefit to the public of having its governmental agents free to act as the duties of their
offices required without fear of harassment or responsibility for damages at the suit of
a citizen outweighed the protection of the individual against damage caused by
oppression or malicious action of a federal official." Id. at 844. The court relied on
Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 569 (1959), where the Supreme Court declared that
the privilege applied to "civil damage suits for defamation and kindred torts," and
cited other cases where it applied to such actions as false arrest, malicious prosecution
and conspiracy.
Compare the similar problem regarding the defamation privilege given to a witness
in a judicial proceeding. Courts have held that the policy behind it is sufficiently
strong to make the privilege still applicable when the plaintiff seeks to avoid it by
bringing an action for conspiracy to defame, Marrinan v. Vibert, [1962] 3 Weekly
L.R. 912 (C.A.); Cabassi v. Vila, 64 Commw. L.R. 130 (1940); an action in the nature
of malicious prosecution, see Brett, M.R., in Munster v. Lamb, 11 Q.B.D. 588, 601-02
(1883); or an action for violation of an insulting-words statute, Verner v. Verner, 64
Miss. 321, 1 So. 479 (1886). Unquestionably, the policy would be broad enough to
prevent a successful action for invasion of the right of privacy.
125. As Professor Winfield expressed it, "any attempt to import wholesale into
the law of privacy principles of the law of defamation is likely to confuse both topics.
... Fair comment and privilege, as known in the law of defamation, should be applied
only sparingly and, at most, by way of analogy." Winfield, Privacy, 47 L.Q. REv. 23,
42 (1931). On the similar question as to whether the defamation privileges are directly
applicable or are to be treated as analogous in an action under a statute creating
liability for abusive and insulting language, see Malone, Insult in Retaliation-the
Huckabee Case, 11 Miss. L.J. 333, 336 (1939).
126. See RESTATEmmNT, ToRTs § 613 (1938).
127. Themo v. New England Newspaper Publishing Co., 306 Mass. 54, 27 N.E.2d
753 (1940); see note 119 supra.




sensibilities is one for the jury to decide129-unless of course, as with other
jury questions, it is so clear that the jury could reach only one reasonable
result.130 The courts have just as consistently, however, decided them-
selves, as a matter of law whether the communications involved a matter
of legitimate public interest.131 There is practically no discussion of why
this is treated as a matter of law, but it is obvious that the reason is that
there are here involved important matters of freedom of speech and of the
press; and the courts are not ready to delegate the delicate weighing
process here to the jury.
There is no reason to believe that the very technical rules of pleading in
defamation 132 will be imported into the law of privacy. None of the privacy
cases give any indication of a requirement of an inducement, an innuendo,
or a colloquium. The question of reference to the plaintiff has been raised
in several cases, but has been solved without resort to technical rules of
pleading. Thus it is held that reference by name133-even the first name'
34
-or by picture 135 may be sufficient. But when the defendant dramatizes a
newsworthy episode in which the plaintiff played a part, without naming
or pointing to the plaintiff in any significant way, several cases have held
that there was not sufficient reference to the plaintiff to amount to an
unwarranted invasion of his right of privacy.1' Use of a fictitious name in
129. E.g., Strickler v. National Broadcasting Co., 167 F. Supp. 68 (S.D. Cal. 1958);
Harms v. Miami Daily News, Inc., 127 So. 2d 715 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1901); cf.
Leverton v. Curtis Publishing Co., 192 F.2d 974 (3d Cir. 1951).
130. Compare for example, the conflicting opinions in Sutton v. Hearst Corp., 277
App. Div. 155, 98 N.Y.S.2d 233 (1950).
131. See, e.g., Jenkins v. Dell Publishing Co., 251 F.2d 447 (3d Cir. 1958); Sidis
v. F-R Publishing Corp., 113 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1940); Berg v. Minneapolis Star &
Tribune Co., 79 F. Supp. 957 (D. Minn. 1048); Gill v. Hearst Publishing Co., 40 Cal.
2d 224, 253 P.2d 441 (1953); Buzinski v. Doall Co., 31 Ill. App. 2d 191, 175 N.E.2d
577 (1961); Sellers v. Henry, 329 S.W.2d 214 (Ky. 1959); Barber v. Time, Inc., 348
Mo. 1199, 159 S.W.2d 291 (1942); Meetze v. Associated Press, 230 S.C. 330, 95
S.E.2d 606 (1956). In Bernstein v. National Broadcasting Co., 129 F. Supp. 817
(D.D.C. 1955), aff'd on opinion below, 232 F.2d 369 (D.C. Cir. 1956), the court
draws a distinction between the question of whether the communication would cause
"mental suffering, shame, or humiliation to a person of ordinary sensibilities," and
the question of whether the publication was "unwarranted . . . that is, absence of any
waiver or privilege authorizing it." It characterizes the first as a "fact question for the
jury" and the second as "a mixed question of fact and law." 129 F. Supp. at 831.
But cf. Aquino v. Bulletin Co., 190 Pa. Super. 528, 154 A.2d 422 (1959).
132. See Wyse, The Complaint in Libel and Slander: A Dilemma For Plaintiff, 33
Cm.-KrNT L. REV. 313 (1955); NEvELL, SrAuN AuN LIBEL ch. 18 (4th ed. 1924).
133. E.g., Mau v. Rio Grande Oil, Inc., 28 F. Supp. 845 (N.D. Cal. 1939) (dramati-
zation of holdup in radio program); Melvin v. Reid, 112 Cal. App. 285, 297 Pac. 91
(Dist. Ct. App. 1931) (movie, "The Red Kimono"); cf. Kerby v. Hal Roach Studios,
Inc., 53 Cal. App. 2d 207, 127 P.2d 577 (Dist. Ct. App. 1942) (plaintiff's name used
by error in suggestive advertising letter).
134. Cason v. Baskin, 155 Fla. 198, 20 So. 2d 243 (1944) (book Cross Creek con-
tained portrayal of "Zelma").
135. Peay v. Curtis Publishing Co., 78 F. Supp. 305 (D.D.C. 1948); Valerni v. Hearst
Magazines, Inc., 99 N.Y.S.2d 866 (Sup. Ct. 1949).
136. E.g., Bernstein v. National Broadcasting Co., 129 F. Supp. 817 (D.D.C. 1955),
[VEOL. 15
RIGHT OF PRIVACY
a novel has been held not actionable merely because some of the events
were similar to those of a living person. 37 There appear to be no privacy
cases leaning toward the discredited defamation doctrine that language
will always be interpreted in mitiore sensu.131
As to limitation of actions, the reported cases are in accord that the
statute of limitations for libel and slander does not apply to an action for
an invasion of the right of privacy.139 The decision, of course, depends
upon the language of the statute and the court's interpretation of it. In
Hazlitt v. Fawcett Publications, Inc.,140 the court held that where there
was a different statute of limitations for the two actions so that a libel count
was barred, while a privacy count was not, all libelous statements had to
be eliminated from the privacy count since the libel statute had run on
them. The case involved a magazine account of a trial for murder, and
the true statements would probably not be actionable since they involved
matters of public interest. This holding, therefore, left an action for the
fictionalized parts of the account which were not libelous in nature. Other
aff'd on opinion below, 232 F.2d 369 (D.C. Cir. 1956) (television program "The Big
Story"-murder trial); Miller v. National Broadcasting Co., 157 F. Supp. 240 (D. Del.
1957) ("The Big Story"-bank robbery); Smith v. National Broadcasting Co., 138 Cal.
App. 2d 807, 292 P.2d 600 (Dist. Ct. App. 1956) ("Dragnet"-false report of escape
of black panther). In. the Bernstein case, supra, Judge Keech gave careful considera-
tion to the matter and distinguished Melvin v. Reid, supra note 133 because the
plaintiff was there identified. "Public identification of the present person with past
facts, however, would constitute a new disclosure and, if unwarranted, would infringe
upon an existing privacy. Thus, it would appear that protection which time may bring
to a formerly public figure is not against repetition of the facts which are already public
property, but against unreasonable public identification of him in his present setting
with the earlier incident." 129 F. Supp. at 828. In Hill v. Hayes, 27 Misc. 2d 863, 207
N.Y.S.2d 901 (Sup. Ct. 1960), aff'd mem., 13 App. Div. 2d 954, 216 N.Y.S.2d 497
(1961), an experience of a family in being held hostage by escaping convicts for a
day was used as the basis of the novel, The Desperados, and a subsequent play and
movie. Life magazine then came out with a picture story indicating that plaintiffs
were the "true life" family of the book, with pictures in parallel columns. In an action
under the New York statute it was held error to grant a summary judgment for de-
fendants.
With the privacy cases contrast such libel decisions as Youssouppoff v. Metro-Goldwyn-
Mayer Pictures, Ltd., 50 T.L.R. 581 (C.A. 1934) (plaintiff claimed she was portrayed
as a character in the movie "Rasputin"); and American Broadcasting-Paramount
Theatres, Inc. v. Simpson, 126 S.E.2d 873 (Ga. App. 1962) (plaintiff claimed that he
was portrayed as a prison guard in an episode from "The Untouchables").
137. Toscani v. Hersey, 271 App. Div. 445, 65 N.Y.S.2d 814 (1946) ("Major Victor
Joppolo," the Sicilian senior civil affairs officer in John Hersey's A Bell For Adano).
138. For history of the doctrine in defamation, see BowER, Ac-ONABLE DEFAMA-
TroN 302-05 (2d ed. 1923); cf. Spiegel, Defamation By Implication-In the Confidential
Manner, 29 So. CAL. L. REv. 306, 312 (1956).
139. Hazlitt v. Fawcett Publications, Inc., 116 F. Supp. 538 (D. Conn. 1953);
Annerino v. Dell Publishing Co., 17 Ill. App. 2d 205, 149 N.E.2d 761 (1958); Hull
v. Curtis Publishing Co., 182 Pa. Super. 86, 125 A.2d 644 (1956). See also Fouts
v. Fawcett Publications, Inc., 116 F. Supp. 535 (D. Conn. 1953); cf. Frith v. Asso-
ciated Press, 176 F. Supp. 671 (E.D.S.C. 1959).
140. 116 F. Supp. 538 (D. Conn. 1953).
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cases, though they also involved fictionalized parts; have not drawn a
distinction between the libelous parts and the other false parts in the
account,141 and it seems quite anomalous to draw it. If the action is
for invasion of the right of privacy and the language used constituted an
invasion, the fact that a different action might, but need not, have been
successfully brought for part of the language, if it had been brought
earlier, would seem to be irrelevant. After all, there are other places in
the law where particular conduct may give rise to separate kinds of action
with different statutes of limitation, and the plaintiff has a choice as to
the kind of action he will bring.142
On survival of the cause of action, the only significant decision is that
of Reed v. Real Detective Publishing Co.143 The Arizona statute provided
for survival of "an action to recover damages for injuries to the person."
Actions for libel and for invasion of the right of privacy were brought for
a magazine story of a crime. One of the defendants had died, and the
court held that the libel action did not come within the statutory provision
but that the privacy action did, so that it survived. 144 Again, the problem
is one of statutory language and statutory interpretation, but it is apparent
141. In Annerino v. Dell Publishing Co., 17 Ill. App. 2d 205, 149 N.E.2d 761 (1958),
a story, "If You Love Me, Slip Me A Gun," in the magazine Inside Detective, carried
a picture of plaintiff, wife of a police detective shot by a criminal following an escape.
Said the court: "the complaint sufficiently alleges an unwarranted invasion of plaintiff's
right of privacy. It follows, therefore, that defendants' contention that the complaint
states a cause of action for defamation by libel, barred by the statute of limitations, is
equally without merit." Id. at 211, 149 N.E.2d at 763-64. In Hull v. Curtis Publishing
Co., 182 Pa. Super. 86, 125 A.2d 644 (1956), also involving a picture in a magazine
article, the privacy action was held barred by the statute of limitations, but it was a
different, longer statute than the one for libel. Reed v. Real Detective Publishing Co.,
63 Ariz. 294, 162 P.2d 133 (1945) likewise involved a magazine story of a crime,
allegedly containing false and defamatory statements. The court indicated that a
privacy action came within the two-year statute for "injuries to the person" rather
than the one-year period for "injuries done to the character or reputation of another
by libel or slander."
142. Thus, one who converts a chattel may be subjected to an action of trover with a
short statute of limitations for tort actions, an action of replevin with a longer statute
of limitations for property actions, or an action of quasi-contract (waiver of tort) with
a still longer statute of limitations for contract actions. For cases allowing the longer
limitations period in waiver of tort, see Dentists' Supply Co. v. Cornelius, 281 App.
Div. 306, 119 N.Y.S.2d 570, aff'd mem., 308 N.Y. 624, 116 N.E.2d 238 (1953); Kirk-
man v. Phillip's Heirs, 54 Tenn. 222 (1872); Jacobs v. City of Seattle, 100 Wash. 524,
171 Pac. 662 (1918); see York, Extension of Restitutional Remedies in the Tort Field,
4 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 499, 545-46 (1957).
143. 63 Ariz. 294, 162 P.2d 133 (1945).
144. In rendering the decision that libel was not an "injury to the person" the court
was influenced by the fact that there was a one-year statute of limitations for "injuries
done to the character or reputation of another by libel or slander" and a two-year
statutory period for "injuries done to the person." 162 P.2d at 137. It declared that
invasion of the right of privacy "must be considered as a direct rather than an indirect
injury and one that is wholly personal in character . . . . An injury . . . which affects
the sensibilities is equally an injury to the person as an injury to the body would be
.... " Id. at 139.
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that a different rule may be applied to an action for defamation and to a
privacy action for defamatory language.
The suggestion has been made that there is greater likelihood of obtain-
ing injunctive relief if the action is for invasion of privacy rather than for
defamation. 145 But the suggestion seems dubious, particularly regarding a
privacy action for false statements about the plaintiff.146 Policy reasons for
declining to issue a prior restraint are equally valid in both types of
action.147
The question of the application of special defamation statutes to privacy
actions is raised in a few cases. Thus in Werner v. Times-Mirror Co.,14
there was involved the California newspaper retraction statute.149 The
action involved a newspaper item about the second marriage of a man
who had been a prominent political figure thirty years earlier. The article
called up old details and added others alleged to be false and probably
libelous. Plaintiff had not complied with the retraction statute and alleged
no special damages, claiming that his action for invasion of privacy was not
affected by the statute. The court held that a general demurrer to the
complaint was properly sustained. The retraction statute was held to be
the "declared ... public policy of the state." As to statements "libelous in
nature," the court said,
to permit him to recover general damage in this case under the theory of
the invasion of his right of privacy is to sanction an evasion of the provision
of section 48a of the Civil Code. If such recovery cannot be had in the case
of libelous statements, no greater relief could be reasonably expected for
statements in the challenged publication which are of a nonlibelous char-
acter. 150
145. Spiegel, Public Celebrity v. Scandal Magazine-The Celebrity's Right to
Privacy, 30 So. CAL. L. Rzv. 280, 293-95 (1957).
146. The only case cited for this is Douglas v. Disney Prods., decided by a trial
court in Los Angeles and reported only in the Los Angeles Daily Journal, Dec. 31,
1956, p. 27, col. 3. '
Different rules may be applied so that an injunction may be granted in cases in-
volving property interests such as appropriation of a name or in cases involving invasions
of the plaintiff's seclusion or solitude. These are the first and fourth of Dean Prosser's
list of the "four torts" involved in the right of privacy. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAaIF.
L. REV. 383, 389 (1960).
147. See Pound, Equitable Relief Against Defamation. and Injuries to Personality, 29
HAnv. L. RIv. 640 (1916); Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
148. 193 Cal. App. 2d 111, 14 Cal. Rptr. 208 (Dist. Ct. App. 1961); 50 CALIF.
L. REv. 357 (1962).
149. "In any action for damages for the publication of a libel in a newspaper, or of
a slander by radio broadcast, plaintiff shall recover no more than special damages unless
a correction be demanded and be not published or broadcast, as hereinafter provided.
... 'General damages' are damages for loss of reputation, shame, mortification and hurt
feelings ...." CAL. Civ. CoDE § 48a (Deering 1961).
150. 14 Cal. Rptr. 208, at 215. The court calls attention to the fact that "general
damages" include shame, mortification and hurt feelings."
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The decision that the policy of the retraction statute is broad enough to
include false statements which are made the basis of a privacy action is a
very reasonable one. Once again it is a question of interpretation of the
language of the statute and the purpose behind it.
In the Werner case, a motion to dismiss had also been made because the
plaintiff had failed to file a bond for costs as required in libel actions under
section 830 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The trial court dismissed this
motion, thus indicating its belief that the statute was not applicable to the
privacy suit, and the court of appeals made no comment on this action.
In an earlier case the court had indicated that the statute was not appli-
cable to a privacy action,' 5 ' Thus, the policy behind this statute appears
to be not so broad in its coverage.
The conflict of laws as to defamation cases is in a state of complete
confusion, with ten or twelve different rules being offered for determining
the governing law.52 There is some indication that the same confusion
may arise regarding the right of privacy, 53 but some of the recent cases
have indicated that since the nature of the injury here is the impact of the
publication upon the plaintiff and his sensibilities, the law which should
govern is that of his domicile, especially if the invasion first came to his
attention there. 54
IV. CONCLUSION
Privacy is now fully established as a legally protected right in the United
States. Of the four recognized types of invasion of the right of privacy,
the two which are most closely analogous to the right of reputation, as
protected by the law of defamation, are "public disclosure of embarrassing
private facts about the plaintiff" and "publicity which places the plaintiff
in a false light in the public eye." 55 These two differ only in that the
first involves a true statement and the other a false statement. The hurt
to the plaintiff's feelings, the damage to his sensibilities, is essentially the
same in both cases. If the true statement is actionable in privacy, the
false statement should be actionable too. A plaintiff's action for invasion
151. Kerby v. Hal Roach Studios, Inc., 53 Cal. App. 2d 207, 127 P.2d 577, 581-82
(Dist. Ct. App. 1942).
152. For detailed discussion and collection of cases see Leflar, Choice of Law: Torts:
Current Trends, 6 VA"r. L. REV. 447, 453-58 (1953); Prosser, Interstate Publication,
51 MIcH. L. R1Ev. 959 (1953), also in PRossEn, SELECTED Topics ON THZ LAW OF
TORTS 70 (1953); Warner, Multistate Publication in Radio and Television, 23 LAw &
CoT=EmZp. PRoB. 14 (1958).
153. See Ludwig, "Peace of Mind" in 48 Pieces versus Uniform Right of Privacy, 32
MINN. L. REv. 734 (1948).
154. See Bernstein v. National Broadcasting Co., 129 F. Supp. 817 (D.D.C. 1955),
aff'd on opinion below, 232 F.2d 369 (D.C. Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 945
(1956); Strickler v. National Broadcasting Co., 167 F. Supp. 68 (S.D. Cal. 1958). See
also Note, 19 U. Prrr. L. REv. 98 (1957).
155. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CA.Lw. L. RE.v. 383, 389 (1960).
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of the right of privacy should not be subject to the defense that the
communication is true or false, if it is one which could be offensive to a
person of ordinary sensibilities. 156 And if a non-defamatory false statement
is actionable because it invades the plaintiff's right of privacy, a defamatory
statement should be actionable for the same reason. 5 7
It is true that this produces an overlap with the law of defamation. It
is also true that the great majority of defamation actions can now be
brought for invasion of the right of privacy and that many of the restric-
tions and limitations of libel and slander can be avoided. As lawyers come
to realize this, the action for invasion of the right of privacy may come
to supplant the action for defamation. This supplanting of one action by
another has happened before in legal history, 58 and it can happen again.
For this reason one experienced and astute writer in the field has sounded
a note of caution, and suggested that we exercise "concern over where
privacy may be going." Dean Prosser continues by saying:
The question may well be raised, and apparently still is unanswered, whether
this branch of the tort is not capable of swallowing up and engulfing the
whole law of public defamation; and whether there is any false libel printed,
for example, in a newspaper, which cannot be redressed upon the alternative
ground. If that turns out to be the case, it may well be asked, what of the
numerous restrictions and limitations which have hedged defamation about
for many years, in the interest of freedom of the press and the discourage-
ment of trivial and extortionate claims? .Are they of so little consequence
that they may be circumvented in so casual and cavalier a fashion?15 9
Over the years, judges and legal writers have joined in condemning the
"anomalies and absurdities" of the law of defamation. 160 Efforts at legal
156. A communication of newsworthy or educational matter is of course not an
unwarranted invasion of the right of privacy. In this regard truth of the statement
may therefore be relevant to liability.
157. "It is no answer to say, as defendants do, that such untruths, if they exist,
can be adequately compensated for under the libel laws. If the articles violate rights
of privacy, plaintiffs may bring their action under the privacy laws also." Garner v.
Triangle Publications, Inc., 97 F. Supp. 546, 550 (S.D.N.Y. 1951). "Although the
interest ostensibly protected in privacy cases is the plaintiff's hurt feelings, his reputa-
tion is also injured in the defamatory 'false light' cases. To deny a recovery in privacy
in these cases, while allowing recovery when defamation is not involved, would seem
to put an unjustified premium on hurt feelings." 50 CALmF. L. REV. 342, 363 n.57
(1962).
158. For example in the supplanting of debt by indebitatus or general assumpsit,
and of detinue by trover. It usually happens when the new action is simpler and less
ponderous and burdened by arbitrary restrictions than the older one.
159. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALUw. L. REv. 383, 401 (1960). See also id. at 422-23;
and see Comment, 50 CAniF. L. Rsv. 357 (1962), urging that the right of privacy
should not be extended to the "false light cases" except when there is an appropriation
of plaintiff's name or likeness.
160. As Justice Kenison says in Blanchard v. Claremont Eagle, 95 N.H. 375, 63
A.2d 791, 792 (1949), "for the most part any thoughtful consideration of the present
state of the law of libel either begins or ends with a combined apology and lament."
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reform have proved quite unsuccessful. The customary common law
growth through gradual judicial modification has been hampered and
restricted by the numerous detailed rules, which have resisted synthesis
into broad principles or standards. Similarly, legislative reform has been
generally ineffective because a complete revision of the whole system was
required and no one has been willing to undertake a statutory code cover-
ing the whole subject. The penetration of the law of privacy into this field
affords a splendid opportunity for reform of the traditional law regarding
the actionability of language which harms an individual's peace of mind or
his reputation. This reform can take the customary common law method
of gradual judicial development, case by case, of the principles involved.
The opportunity should be welcomed by courts and writers, and there is
reason to believe that it will be as it becomes more readily apparent and
therefore more easily recognized.' 61
Of course, the courts should proceed carefully. Of course, the courts
should be careful, doublf careful, to preserve the interests in freedom of
speech and of the press, which are to some extent safeguarded by some
of the rigid rules of the law of defamation, which developed in the early
days of the common law, long before there was any clear concept of free-
dom of speech and of the press. As a matter of fact, there is much more
consideration given to the public interests of freedom of speech in the
recent right-of-privacy cases than in most of the defamation cases.162 The
simple standard that the plaintiff must prove that the defandant committed
an unreasonable or unwarranted invasion of his right of privacy permits the
conflicting policies and interests to be brought out into the open and
Slander of course, is worse. Dean Prosser uses his customary vivid language: "It must
be confessed at the beginning that there is a great deal of the law of defamation which
makes no sense. It contains anomalies and absurdities for which no legal writer ever
has a kind word, and it is a curious compound of strict liability imposed upon innocent
defendants, as rigid and extreme as anything found in the law, with a blind and
almost perverse refusal to compensate the plaintiff for real and very serious harm. The
explanation is in part one of historical accident and survival, in part one of conflict
of opposing ideas of policy ... . PRossEn, TORTS 572 (2d ed. 1955). "No branch
of the law has been more fertile of litigation than this . . . nor has any been more
perplexed with minute and barren distinction." Por.ocx, TORTS 177 (15th ed. 1951).
Other quotations might be multiplied indefinitely.
161. By accepting the opportunity, the courts will be able to meet Sir Frederick
Pollock's challenge that "the law [of defamation] went wrong from the beginning
in making the damage and not the insult the cause of action; and this seems the
stranger when we have seen that with regard to assault a sounder principle is well
established." POLLOCK, TORTS 181 (15th ed. 1951).
162. For representative privacy cases involving a good discussion of the conflicting
interests, see Jenkins v. Dell Publishing Co., 251 F.2d 447 (3rd Cir. 1958); Sidis v.
F-R Publishing Corp., 113 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 711 (1940);
Berg v. Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co., 79 F. Supp. 957 (D. Minn. 1948); Gill v.
Hearst Publishing Co., 40 Cal. 2d 224, 253 P.2d 441 (1953); Gill v. Curtis Publishing
Co., 38 Cal. 2d 273, 239 P.2d 630 (1952); Barber v. Time, Inc., 348 Mo. 1199, 159
S.W.2d 291 (1942); Sarat Lahiri v. Daily Mirror, Inc., 162 Misc. 776, 295 N.Y.
Supp. 382 (Sup. Ct. 1937).
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essentially directs the court to give due weight to them.162 a The myriad rules
of defamation and their artificial and conflicting natures conceal and
confuse the actual policies involved, so that a jury cannot appreciate
them, and even a judge, unless he is unusually wise and perceptive, is
misled into attempting to interpret the exact language of rules set out
many years ago, rather than to give due consideration to what should be
the underlying policies. As for the function of the rules of defamation in
discouraging "trivial and extortionate claims," contrast the effect of such
rules as metior sensus or pleading requirements of inducement, colloquium,
and innuendo with the objective standard in the law of privacy that the
communication must be offensive to the person of ordinary sensibilities.
Perhaps a few courts have sometimes been a little too ready to allow this
last issue to go to the jury, but this is easily remedied by tightening the
application rather than by setting up a special rule of law that knocks out
many legitimate claims in order to eliminate some others that are not so
worthy.
As a matter of fact, the major problem today is not trivial claims but
excessive damages. 163 Here the courts need to exercise more care than
they are now using. Since the very first privacy case,164 it has often been
held that an action can be maintained successfully for both defamation
and invasion of the right of privacy, usually by separate counts in one
162a. The standard of what a reasonable man would do under the same or similar
circumstances in the law of negligence has been broken down by legal writers to a
formula of balancing the magnitude of the risk against the utility of the risk, with a
listing of the various factors involved. See Terry, Negligence, 29 Hanv. L. REv. 40
(1915); RESTATE ET, ToarTs §§ 291-93 (1934). Is a similar break-down to a
formula feasible for determining when there has been an unreasonable invasion of the
right of privacy? We might speak of balancing the seriousness of the injury to plaintiff
against the importance of the social interests advanced by the statement. Factors
involved in the first would include the measure of offensive character of the statement,
its truth or falsity, and the nature and extent of dissemination. Factors included in the
second would involve the extent to which the statement promotes the dissemination of
newsworthy, cultural, or educational information, ideas, or opinions; the satisfaction of
public curiosity in accordance with recognized mores; the protection of consequential
private interests of defendant or other parties; and the preservation of public interests
in the proper administration or governmental functions. This, of course, is only a
rough beginning and an indication of what a refined formula might provide. For
similar formulas in the field of constitutional law, see L. Hand, J., in United States
v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201, 212 (2d Cir. 1950) ("In each case they must ask whether
the gravity of the 'evil,' discounted by its improbability, justifies such invasion of free
speech as is necessary to avoid the danger"); Harlan, J., in Barenblatt v. United States,
360 U.S. 109, 126 (1959) ("Where First Amendment rights are asserted to bar
governmental interrogation resolution of the issue always involves a balancing by the
courts of the competing private tnd public interests at stake in the particular circum-
stances shown").
163. In earlier days the court trials provided entertainment for the people and many
trivial defamation actions were brought to make the plaintiff the center of community
attention. Today, this motive is minimized. But the motive of obtaining a monetary
windfall has become much stronger..
164. Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190, 50 S.E. 6& (1905).
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civil action.165 The cases do not indicate how much attention is given to
the prevention of duplication of damages. If the action in defamation can
be maintained, plaintiff is entitled to damages for mental distress; 166 and, if
the privacy action can be maintained for being publicly placed in a false
position, it could appear that plaintiff can recover damages for the harm
to his reputation from the position in which he is so placed. A better
position is taken by the New York cases which indicate that there is only
a single action for the one transaction with complete damages being given
for it.167
The courts have been wise to treat the weight to be given to public
interest in freedom of speech and press as an issue of law and thus to retain
it for themselves and not to submit it to the jury. They will also be vise
to follow the position requiring the plaintiff to show that the defendant's
action amounted to an unvarranted invasion of his right of privacy rather
than to adopt the defamation system of prima facie case, rebutted by
privilege and rebutted in turn by abuse of privilege. Decisions in defama-
tion privilege cases, particularly those dealing with fair comment, may
prove helpful by analogy in privacy cases. So also may cases drawing a
distinction between statements of fact and statements of opinion. The strict
liability of defamation law has no place in privacy law. Pleading restric-
tions should not be imported from one to the other. Application of statutes
such as limitation of actions, retractions, etc., depends on the language of
the statute and the breadth of the policy behind it.
Subject to careful consideration of adjustments such as these in the
relationship of the two torts, the courts should not hesitate to proceed in
a cautious fashion toward the further development of the law of privacy.
If the law of privacy then absorbs the law of defamation, it will merely
afford a complete "unfolding" of the idea or principle behind that law.
Indeed, there is real reason to conclude that the principle behind the law
of privacy is much broader than the idea of privacy itself, .and that the
165. See, e.g., Peay v. Curtis Publishing Co., 78 F. Supp. 305 (D.D.C. 1948);
Linehan v. Linehan, 134 Cal. App. 2d 250, 285 P.2d 326 (Dist. Ct. App. 1955);
Bennett v. Norban, 396 Pa. 94, 151 A.2d 476 (1959). But compare the viewpoint
expressed in Binns v. Vitagraph Co., 210 N.Y. 51, 103 N.E. 1108, 1111 (1913): "It
would be difficult to avoid a double recovery if the jury were to be permitted in one
action to give damages under the [New York privacy] statute for a violation of rights
protected thereby, and in another action for the libel based on the same acts."
166. RFsTATEMENT, TORTS § 623 (1938).
167. Russell v. Marboro Books, 18 Misc. 2d 166, 183 N.Y.S.2d 8 (Sup. Ct. 1959);
Metzger v. Dell Publishing Co., 207 Misc. 182, 136 N.Y.S.2d 888 (Sup. Ct. 1955); of.
D'Altomonte v. New York Herald Co., 154 App. Div. 453, 139 N.Y. Supp. 200
(1913), modified, 208 N.Y. 596, 102 N.E. 1101 (1913). See also Freeman v.
Busch Jewelry Co., 98 F. Supp. 963 (N.D. Ga. 1951), explaining that under Georgia
law the court has only to find that a tort has been committed and assess damages.
"It is not necessary for this court to label plaintiff's action as one arising from violation
of the right of privacy as plaintiff contends . . . or, as seems more likely to this court,
as arising from publication of a libel." Id. at 966.
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whole law of privacy will become a part of the larger tort of intentional
infliction of mental suffering. That tort would then absorb established torts
like assault and defamation and invasion of the right of privacy and join
them together with other innominate torts to constitute a single, integrated
system of protecting plaintiff's peace of mind against acts of the defendant
intended to disturb it. This development is clearly discernable to the
perceptive eye and has been the subject of comment by a number of
writers. 68
168. See generally, Davis, What Do We Mean By "Right to Privacyp", 4 S.D.L.
REV. 1 (1959); Green, The Right of Privacy, 27 ILL. L. REV. 237 (1932); Harper
& McNeely, A Reexamination of the Basis for Liability for Emotional Distress, 1938
Wis. L. REv. 426; Magruder, Mental and Emotional Disturbance in the Law of Torts,
49 I-Iv. L. REv. 1033 (1936); Prosser, Intentional Infliction of Mental Suffering:
A New Tort, 37 MicH. L. REv. 874 (1939); Prosser, Insult and Outrage, 44 CALwF. L.
REV. 40 (1956); Vold, Tort Recovery for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress,
18 NEB. L. BULL. 222 (1939); Wade, Tort Liability for Abusive and Insulting
Language, 4 VAND. L. REv. 63 (1950).

